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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Whether the district court erred in granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(Justiciability), effectively ruling that no justiciable controversy exists with
respect to two provisions of Utah's initiative statute.

Although neither Defendants' motion nor the district court's ruling references Rule
12(b)(6), Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability) is grounded in that rule. This Court
reviews the district court's decision de novo. Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of LatterDay Saints, 2001 UT 25, ^{10, 21 P.3d 198. This issue was preserved in the trial court by
motion. See R. at 311-13 (Defendants' Motion); id. at 326-36 (Safe Havens' opposition
memorandum); id. at 411-17 (Defendants' reply memorandum); id. at 499-504 (ruling).
2.

Whether the district court erred in denying Safe Havens' Motion for Summary
Judgment, and in granting Defendants' Cross-Motion, effectively ruling that
three provisions of Utah's initiative statute are constitutional.

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions onfile,together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Kouris v. Utah Highway Patrol 2003 UT 19, %5970 P.3d 72. On
appeal, "[t]he trial court's resolution of the legal issues [presented in a summary judgment
motion] is accorded no deference since entitlement to summary judgment is a question of
law." Kouris, 2003 UT 19, ^|5. These issues were preserved in the trial court. R. at 36-39
(Safe Havens' motion); id. at 370-410 (Defendants' opposition); id. at 337-39 (Defendants'
cross-motion); id. at 434-97 (Safe Havens' reply memorandum); id. at 499-504 (ruling).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Safe Havens challenges the constitutionality offiveprovisions of Utah's Election Code:
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-201 (2)(a)(ii), which requires that sponsors of citizen
initiatives obtain signatures equal to 10% of the total of all votes cast for governor in
26 of Utah's 29 Senate districts ("the Senate District Requirement");
•
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-202(4)(a), which requires sponsors of citizen
initiatives to qualify their petition for the general election ballot "no later than one year
after the application is filed" ("the One-Year Requirement");
•
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-202(5)(d), which requires the lieutenant governor to
automatically reject, at the initial application stage, any citizen initiative that is
"identical or substantially similar to" any initiative submitted to the lieutenant governor
for certification within the last two years ("the Same-or-Similar Ban'5);
•
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-204.1, which requires sponsors of citizen initiative to
notice, hold, and document "at least seven public hearings throughout Utah" in various
specific locations, even before circulating the initiative for signatures ("the Public
Meetings Requirement"); and
•
Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-205(3), which allows signers of citizen initiative
petitions to remove their names from the petitions after the petitions have been
submitted to the county clerks ("the Signature Removal Provisions").
Safe Havens asserts that these statutes violate the following constitutional provisions:
•

Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which reserves to the people of
the State of Utah the power to initiate legislation;

•

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees to the people of
the State of Utah the uniform operation of the laws;

•

Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution, which guarantees to the people of
the State of Utah freedom of speech;

•

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantee
to the citizens of the United States freedom of speech and political expression.

Finally, Safe Havens' lawsuit was filed pursuant to the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. The full text of each of these statutes and constitutional
provisions can be found in the addendum.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Safe Havens filed this action on April 30, 2003, seeking declaratory relief that either
(a) the 2003 amendments to Utah's Election Code were not retroactive and could not be
applied to its citizen initiative filed in March 2003, before the new law took effect, or (b) five
separate provisions of Utah's Election Code violated both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions.
Safe Havens filed a motion for speedy hearing, and the parties stipulated to an
accelerated schedule. Safe Havens filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on May 5, 2003.
Defendants opposed Safe Havens' motion, and filed both a Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment as well as a Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability), asking that the district court hold that
no justiciable controversy existed with respect to two of the challenged provisions, and to hold
all of the provisions constitutional.

During the briefing period, Defendants took the

depositions of two professional initiative campaign consultants. No other discovery was had.
The motions came before the district court for hearing on June 16, 2003. Three days
later, the district court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Justiciability) and Defendants'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Safe Havens' Motion for Summary
Judgment. On June 30, 2003, the district court entered a final Order and Judgment. On July
2, 2003, Safe Havens filed its Notice of Appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Legislative Journey of the Guns-in-Schools Issue: Despite the Wishes of a Vast
Majority ofUtahns, the Legislature Ultimately Allows Guns in Schools
Some years ago, the Utah legislature enacted a law stating that "[a] person who
possesses a weapon . . . in a public or private elementary or secondary school, on the grounds
of the school, or in those parts of a building, park, or stadium which are being used for an
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activity sponsored by the school is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." See Utah Code Ann. §
53 A-3-502 (repealed 2003). The only exceptions were for persons who had obtained advance
permission from "the responsible school administrator," or persons using the weapon "in
connection with a lawful, approved activity." Id. There was no exception for persons allowed
to carry concealed weapons pursuant to a state permit. Id.
In 1992, the Utah legislature enacted a conflicting law, which made it a misdemeanor
to possess any dangerous weapon "on or about school premises." See Utah Code Ann. § 7610-505.5. However, this new law created an exception for "persons authorized to possess a
firearm" pursuant to a Utah concealed weapons permit. Id. At the time, though, relatively few
Utahns had concealed weapons permits because an applicant was required to show "cause"
to obtain a permit. See R. at 106-07 (1994 version of Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-704).
In 1995, the legislature liberalized Utah's concealed weapons law, making it possible
to obtain a concealed weapons permit without demonstrating any "cause." The new law
allows anyone who applies and "is of good character" to secure a permit. Utah Code Ann. §
53-5-704(1). Since 1995, the number of Utahns possessing concealed weapons permits has
grown from around 1,000 to over 51,000. R. at 108 (stating that "the number of Utahns
allowed to carry a concealed weapon went from 1,000 six years ago to more than 30,000" in
2001); id. at 112 (stating that there were "51,564 total valid permits as of Dec. 31, 2002").
Before and after the 1995 legislation liberalizing the concealed weapons statute was
passed, representatives of the Utah PTA and other education groups informed legislators and
staffers that the new law would create a conflict between the section of the Utah Code that
forbids weapons in schools (53A-3-502) and one that allows concealed weapons permit
holders to carry concealed weapons into schools (76-10-505.5). The legislature responded that
603739v2
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it was aware of the problem, but did not have time to address the issue in the 1995 legislative
session, and would fix the conflict in future legislative sessions. R. at 116-17.
As time went by, however, the Utah legislature did nothing to fix the conflict.
Meanwhile, education officials were unsure whether the burgeoning numbers of concealed
weapons permit holders could lawfully carry their weapons into schools. Id. at 117.
Beginning in approximately 1996, education groups pressed for a legislative solution to the
statutory conflict. Educators (along with other groups) drafted a bill eliminating the conflict
by prohibiting concealed weapons permit holders from carrying weapons into Utah schools,
and obtained powerful legislative sponsors, including Senate President Lane Beattie and Rep.
Dave Jones. Id.
Despite their extensive efforts, however, the education groups and their legislative
allies were not able to advance the bill out of legislative committees. In most years the bill did
not even progress into a legislative committee. See id. In fact, some legislators grew
impatient with the education groups' continued efforts to address the issue through legislation,
making comments such as "How many times do we have to say no?" See id. at 123
(comments of Rep. Blake Chard, R-Layton). Indeed, the legislature seemed completely
unconcerned that an overwhelming majority of Utahns, when asked about the subject in
numerous and varied scientific opinion polls, were in favor of banning guns from schools. See
R. at 123, 125, 129, 131, 132, 135, 138 (seven scientific public opinion polls conducted
between 1998 and 2001 by three polling agencies, showing that 65% to 93% of Utahns want
to ban guns from schools).
In the 2003 legislative session, the Utah legislature resolved the statutory conflict
regarding guns in schools by repealing Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-502. R. at 140-46 (S.B. 108);
603739v2
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id. at 153 (stating that S.B. 108 passed March 3,2003, was signed by the Governor on March
19, 2003, and became effective May 5, 2003). After the 2003 amendment, the law is now
clear that, despite the apparent wishes of an overwhelming majority of Utah citizens, and
despite Safe Havens' efforts that continued into the 2003 legislative session, concealed
weapon permit holders may carry concealed weapons into Utah schools.
The Constitutional Alternative to an Unresponsive Legislature: The Initiative Process
The Utah Constitution states that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people." See
Utah Const, art I, § 2. The people of Utah retained unto themselves, in the state Constitution,
the power to initiate legislation. Utah Const, art. VI, § 1(1) ("[t]he Legislative power of the
State shall be vested i n . . . the Legislature of the State of Utah; and... the people of the State
of Utah"). In other words, the people of Utah yielded some of their power to create law to the
legislature, but explicitly retained the right to make law by popular initiative. The Utah
Constitution specifically reserves unto the people of Utah the power and the right to "initiate
any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to the people for adoption." Id. at art VI,
§ 1 (2)(a)(i)(A). However, the Utah Constitution by necessity leaves to the legislature the task
of enacting a statutory scheme under which the people's initiative right may be exercised. Id.
at art. VI, § l(2)(a)(i) ("[t]he legal voters of the State of Utah" may initiate legislation "in the
numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute").
In 1917, the legislature passed the first initiative statute, setting forth the conditions
under which Utah citizens could place initiatives on the ballot. In that initial statute, the
legislature required that initiative proponents gather signatures equal to 10% of the votes cast
for all candidates for governor in the last general election, and required that proponents meet
the 10% threshold statewide and in 15 of the 29 counties. R. at 156-62. In 1987, the
603739v2
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legislature added a signature removal requirement, granting any voter who has signed an
initiative petition the right to have his or her signature removed from the petition by filing a
notarized statement with the appropriate county clerk. This removal right, which still exists
in the statute, does not terminate until the county clerks transmit the signatures to the
lieutenant governor. R. at 163. In 1995, the legislature amended the statute to require that
all signatures be submitted to the county clerks no later than "June 1 before the regular general
election," and required the county clerks to check and verify all signatures during the month
of June, and submit the verified signatures to the lieutenant governor's office "no later than
July 1." R. at 183-88.
In 1998, the legislature toughened the multi-county requirement, increasing the number
of counties in which initiative sponsors must reach the 10% threshold from 15 to 20. R. at
189. The sponsor of the amendments, Rep. Kevin Garn, defended his bill during floor debates:
[S]ome people would suggest that this will make citizens' initiatives more
difficult. My answer to that is very simple. Citizens' initiatives ought to be held
to a little higher standard. The reason I say that is this is the place right here for
citizens' initiatives.
R. at 190. Opponents of Rep. Garn's amendment pointed out that there was no need to make
it more difficult to place initiatives on the ballot, since few initiatives even qualify for the
ballot in Utah. Indeed, since 1960 only eighteen (18) citizens' measures have even qualified
for the ballot, and, of those, only four (4) have been approved by a majority of Utahns in the
general election. On average, then, only one citizens' initiative per decade manages to
become law in Utah. R. at 198. However, Rep. Garn's amendment ultimately passed.
In 2002, a group of Utah citizens worked to place an initiative known as the Radioactive
Waste Restrictions Act ("RWRA") on the ballot. The RWRA's sponsors obtained roughly
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131,000 signatures, substantially more than the 76,180 signatures required to reach the
statewide 10% threshold. County clerks verified nearly 96,000 of those signatures. See
Gallivan v. Walker. 2002 UT 89,ffl[6-l 1, 54 P.3d 1069. In addition, the RWRA's sponsors
managed to reach the 10% threshold in 26 of the 29 counties.
At that point, however, well-heeled opponents of the RWRA obtained copies of the
signatures from the county clerks, and, between June 1 and July 1, went door-to-door visiting
initiative signers. The opponents, often with notaries public in tow, tried to convince the
signers to recant and sign a notarized statement directing the county clerks to remove their
names from the petition. Opponents successfully persuaded thousands of Utahns to remove
their names from the petition, and, in so doing, reduced the number of counties in which
RWRA sponsors had reached the 10% threshold from 26 to 14. Id. atffl[8-9.A t

that

Point> it

was too late for sponsors to gather additional signatures to counter the door-to-door campaign.
Because RWRA sponsors had not reached the 10% threshold in 20 counties, the lieutenant
governor declared the petition insufficient and refused to certify it for the ballot. Id. at Tfl 1.
RWRA sponsors then filed a petition for an extraordinary writ with this Court, asking
this Court to strike down the multi-county requirement as a violation of the Utah and U.S.
Constitutions. On August 26, 2002, this Court granted the sponsors' requested relief, and
declared that the multi-county requirement was unconstitutional because, inter alia, it unduly
burdened the fundamental right to place initiatives on the ballot. Id.
Legislative reaction to Gallivan was harsh—several legislators went on record criticizing
Gallivan and vowing to change the law. See R. at 199, 202, 204, 206 (comments of Rep.
Garn, Rep. Stephens, and Sen. Mansell). In the 2003 legislative session, the legislature
enacted S.B. 28, substantially revising the initiative statute. Among other changes, S.B. 28:
603739v2
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•

reinstituted a geographic restriction, replacing the unconstitutional 20-of-29counties requirement with the new Senate District Requirement mandating
that sponsors meet the 10% threshold in 26 of Utah's 29 state Senate districts.

•

instituted the Public Meetings Requirement mandating that sponsors notice,
hold, and document at least seven public meetings in different cities around the
state, all before being allowed to even circulate initiative petitions for signature.

•

removed the provisions allowing initiative sponsors to use gathered signatures
for two election cycles. Under the new One-Year Requirement, initiative
sponsors must gather sufficient signatures within one year of the initiative
application filing date. Sponsors who fall short of the required number of
signatures will be required to re-gather all signatures the next time around.

•

instituted a new requirement (the Same-or-Similar Ban) mandating that the
lieutenant governor reject any initiative if it is "identical or substantially similar
to" any initiative submitted within the last two years. This provision will
potentially allow initiative proponents to file sham initiatives for the sole
purpose of disqualifying future real initiatives.

Although the legislature changed many aspects of the initiative law during the 2003 revision,
it specifically did not alter the Signature Removal Provisions. R. at 208-20 (S.B. 28).
During legislative debates on the 2003 amendments, the legislature was keenly aware
of GaUiyan and this Court's admonition that the initiative right could not be unduly burdened.
The legislature's own attorneys issued the following warning in a "Legislative Review Note":
In Gallivan [], the Utah Supreme Court declared that the statewide initiative is a
fundamental right. In analyzing any restrictions placed upon a fundamental right
by the Legislature, the court must find that there is a compelling state interest that
justifies restrictions on the right. The court also declared that, because the
statewide initiative is a fundamental right, the Legislature may not place an
"undue burden" on the initiative right. The court's opinion also suggested that it
was the Legislature's duty to "facilitate" the initiative right.
. . . . [S]ome or all of [S.B. 28] could be declared unconstitutional, depending
upon the opinion of a majority of justices about whether or not each provision
"unduly burdens" the fundamental right of initiative or whether or not the interest
the state asserts in support of the provision is "compelling."
R. at 221. Indeed, some legislators argued during the floor debates that certain features of the
new initiative law did in fact impose an undue burden on the initiative right, and were likely
603739v2
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unconstitutional. R. at 227-28 (Sen. Thomas questioning the constitutionality of the One-Year
Requirement); id. at 231-32 (Sen. Stephenson questioning the constitutionality of the Same-orSimilar Ban, largely because of a concern about sham initiatives, and stating that if the ban
were enacted, the legislature would be "holding the people to a different standard than we hold
ourselves"); id- at 235 (Sen. Valentine questioning the constitutionality of the Public Meetings
Requirement); id- at 247 (Sen. Hale questioning the constitutionality of the Public Meetings
Requirement); id. at 237,247-48 (Sen. Mayne stating that the entire bill was "worth[y of] the
junk pile," noting that the Senate District Requirement would have "a very chilling effect on
the initiative process," and warning that the result of passing the bill would be that "citizens
will hardly ever, ever have an opportunity to address their government through the initiative
process"); id- at 253, 257 (Rep. Becker stating that the new law makes the initiative process
"so difficult that my guess is, unless someone comes in with an enormous amount of money,
they will never get an initiative on the ballot," and cautioning that if the bill passes "we're
going to be [in] court within six months, and the chances of us succeeding, if you look at the
Constitutional note, probably aren't that great"); id. at 259-60 (comments of Rep. Philpot).
Despite these warnings, the legislature passed the bill. Some of the bill's supporters
clearly articulated their rationale for making it harder to place initiatives on the ballot. Rep.
Noel stated that "we have a representative form of government," not direct democracy, that
initiatives are "the exception to the rule," and that law should be made by the legislature, not
by the people directly, because citizens aren't generally capable of understanding the law:
We are elected to represent the people. I found out in the . . . little short time
here, it is very, very difficult to understand all of the intricacies, the nuances that
go along with this legislation. You have to sit down and study it and read it and
see how it affects the law. And when we go out to the people, it's very difficult
for them to understand it. And they base their decisions on emotion and not on
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facts. We have been elected to do that
I think it's a benefit to the people of
. . . Utah that only four initiatives have passed because that's the exception to the
rule. We shouldn't be having initiatives passed every couple years.
Id. at 263-64. S.B. 28 was passed by both houses of the legislature, and was signed into law
by Gov. Leavitt. The law took effect on May 5, 2003. R. at 152. Two professional political
consultants with extensive experience coordinating initiative campaigns in Utah—and whose
depositions were noticed and taken by Defendants in this matter—agree that the new statutory
scheme is more burdensome for citizen initiatives than the scheme Gallivan struck down, and
that the legislature, through the passage of S.B. 28, has made it more difficult for citizens to
initiate desired legislation. R. at 475-76, 490-92; see also infra Note 1.
Safe Havens' Efforts to Use the Initiative Process
After meeting with stiff resistance in the legislature throughout the 1990s, education
groups in favor of banning guns from schools decided to avail themselves of their fundamental
right to place the issue directly before the people. In 1999, they drafted an initiative, filed it
with the lieutenant governor, and began to gather signatures. R. at 117-18. The education
groups, joined in their efforts by a coalition of other interests including certain religious
groups, attempted a grass-roots volunteer-based effort. The coalition made the decision early
on in the process to concentrate its efforts in the rural counties, believing that the hardest part
of the process would be to reach the 10% threshold in 20 counties. R. at 118-19.l

1

This belief was borne out by depositions noticed and taken by Defendants in this matter.
Defendants deposed Richard Arnold, a political consultant who was in charge of gathering
signatures for the 2000 English as the Official Language initiative campaign, and John
Michael, a petition drive coordinator who was in charge of gathering signatures for the 2000
Utah Property Protection Act initiative campaign and the 2002 RWRA initiative campaign.
Both deponents testified that it was extremely difficult and expensive, under Utah law in effect
in 2000 and 2002, to obtain the signatures necessary to place an initiative on the ballot. Both
(continued...)
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Despite many hours of volunteer labor, however, the coalition was unable to reach the
10% threshold in a sufficient number of rural counties, and therefore did not expend a great
deal of effort along the Wasatch Front. The coalition believes that it could have reached the
10% statewide threshold if it had expended the resources. Still, the coalition was able to
gather over 34,000 signatures, and, under the law then in effect, was allowed to use signatures
for two election cycles. The coalition then readied itself for the 2002 ballot. R. at 119-20.
This time, the coalition decided to pay, on a part-time basis, several college students to
gather signatures in the rural counties. The coalition, true to its grass-roots, did not hire a
signature-gathering company nor professional signature gatherers. Throughout 2001 and early
2002, these college students, alongside numerous volunteers, attempted to gather signatures
throughout the state. R. at 120, 267-68. Still, the coalition failed to meet the 10% threshold
in a sufficient number of rural counties. Once again, it decided not to spend the resources
along the Wasatch Front until it actually met the multi-county requirement, and, because it
could not meet the multi-county requirement, it did not spend the resources along the Wasatch
Front. Still, the coalition submitted over 41,000 verified signatures. See R. at 120, 268-69.
In March 2003, in the wake of both the Gallivan opinion and the legislature's 2003
amendments, the education groups, this time under the name "Safe Havens for Learning," filed

1

(...continued)
testified that a successful initiative campaign requires the hiring of "hundreds of people" to
gather signatures and complete other tasks, and requires an ultimate cash reserve of between
$200,000 and $500,000. R. at 473,493. Both deponents stated that Utah's statutory scheme
is among the most restrictive in the country, if not the most restrictive, id. at 476, 495, and
both stated that, although they have not yet attempted to qualify an initiative under Utah's new
statutory scheme, in their opinion the new scheme was more difficult for initiative sponsors,
id. at 475-76,490-92. Both testified that it was virtually impossible, under Utah's system, for
an all-volunteer initiative campaign to succeed. Id. at 474, 493-94.
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a new initiative with the office of the lieutenant governor. Safe Havens filed on March 21,
2003, before S.B. 28 took effect, in hopes of qualifying for the ballot under the post- Gallivan
framework. See R. at 121, 270-71. Soon after filing its application to circulate a petition,
however, Safe Havens was informed by Utah elections officials that it would be required to
comply with the new requirements of S.B. 28. See R. at 272.
Safe Havens disagreed with this position, because its initiative was filed and approved
before the new law took effect, and therefore filed this lawsuit on April 30, 2003. R. at 1.
Soon after the complaint was filed, Lt. Governor Walker sent a second letter to Safe Havens,
informing them that, contrary to the earlier statement, two of the new provisions (the Public
Meetings Requirement and the Same-or-Similar Ban) would not be applied to Safe Havens'
petition, but that the balance of the new law would be applied retroactively. R. at 322.
After briefing on the motion to dismiss and the motions for summary judgment, the
district court determined that there was no justiciable controversy with respect to the Public
Meetings Requirement and the Same-or-Similar Ban because Defendants had decided not to
apply those provisions to Safe Havens' initiative. In addition, the district court determined that
the other three challenged provisions (the Senate District Requirement, the One-Year
Requirement, and the Signature Removal Provisions) were constitutional. This appeal ensued.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the district court erred by refusing to declare that the 2003 amendments to the
Election Code can only be applied prospectively. Nothing in the new law states that it is to
be applied retroactively, and statutes are presumed prospective in the absence of contrary
legislative instruction. A ruling in favor of Safe Havens on this point would moot four of the
five constitutional challenges.
603739v2

"13-

Second, the district court erred in granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(Justiciability). The district court held that there is no justiciable controversy with regard to
two of Safe Havens' constitutional challenges, because Defendants' current position is that
they do not intend to apply the Public Meetings Requirement or the Same-or-Similar Ban to
Safe Havens' initiative. The district court erred, however, because there is a substantial
likelihood that an actual controversy will develop between these parties on these issues, and
therefore under this Court's precedent there is a justiciable controversy.
Third, the district court erred in holding the challenged provisions constitutional. All
five of the challenged provisions violate the Utah and/or the U.S. Constitutions. In Gallivan,
this Court declared that the citizens' right to initiate legislation is a fundamental right that
cannot be unduly burdened. Despite this pronouncement, the legislature has passed a new law
that contains certain provisions that unduly burden the right to initiate legislation. In addition,
the challenged provisions also violate initiative sponsors' free speech rights.
Finally, if this Court strikes down some or all of the challenged provisions, the final
issue to be decided concerns severability. Four of the five challenged provisions are clearly
severable from the remainder of the statute; the legislature's intent regarding the Senate
District Requirement is also clear from specific statutory language. This Court can follow the
legislature's severability clause and strike all five of the challenged provisions.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS (JUSTICIABILITY) AND IN FAILING TO DECLARE THAT
THE 2003 AMENDMENTS ARE PROSPECTIVE
Safe Havens filed its latest initiative—entitled "Safe Havens for Learning"—on March

21,2003, well before S.B. 28's May 2003 effective date. Under retroactivity rules, a party is
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entitled to take advantage of the law at the time it files its action. Therefore, Safe Havens
should be held to the statutory scheme in effect at the time it filed its initiative application.
A.

Retroactivity

"Amendments to statutes are prospective only unless expressly made retroactive."
State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993); see also In re Disconnection of Certain
Territory, 668 P.2d 544, 549 (Utah 1983) ("[t]he well-established general rule is that statutes
not expressly retroactive should only be applied prospectively"). The Utah Code is explicit
on this point, stating that "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3. S.B. 28 does not provide for retroactive effect.
Parties are entitled to "have [their] rights determined on the basis of the law as it existed
at the time of the occurrence." Okland Constr. Co. v. Industrial Common, 520 P.2d 208, 210
(Utah 1974): see also Carlucci v. Utah State Indus. Comm'n. 725 P.2d 1335,1337 (Utah 1986)
(stating that "[t]he general rule is that the law establishing substantive rights and liabilities
when a cause of action arises, and not a subsequently enacted statute, governs the resolution
of the dispute"). Accordingly, Safe Havens should be allowed to proceed with qualifying its
initiative for the ballot under the statutory scheme in effect in March 2003.
Ignoring this precedent, Defendants take the position that there are two, not one, dates
on which government action must be taken with respect to citizen initiatives—one date on
which the government must decide whether to approve the petition for circulation, and one
date on which the government must decide whether to certify the petition for the general
election ballot. Defendants' position is that, if the law changes between those two dates, those
portions of the new law that concern the final certification (rather than the initial approval) of
a citizen initiative can be applied retroactively to the initiative petition.
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In this case, the law at the time Safe Havens' application was approved for circulation
did not contain the Public Meetings Requirement or a Same-or-Similar Ban, so Defendants
maintain that those two provisions of the new law do not apply to Safe Havens' petition.
However, because the law at the time Safe Havens will submit its signatures for final
certification will contain a Senate District Requirement and a One-Year Requirement,
Defendants maintain that those provisions are applicable to Safe Havens' petition. Defendants
have since explained, in legal briefing before the district court, that this opinion is based on
Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660,661 (Utah 1994), a case whose narrow holding is that municipal
initiative sponsors' "entitlement or right to an initiative election did not accrue until the
initiative petition containing a proper number of certified signatures was filed." Id. (emphasis
added). Defendants read far too much into the brief Owens opinion.
In Owens, proponents of a municipal initiative (proposed only for the city of St.
George) filed an initiative application with the city recorder on April 6, 1994. At that time,
then-existing law "arguably permitted the submission of the [municipal] initiative to voters at
the next county-wide election," which was to occur in November 1994. Id. In the 1994
session, however, the legislature amended the statute to provide that municipal initiatives may
only be placed on the ballot in municipal elections, the next one of which was to occur in
November 1995. Id. The statutory amendment did not take effect until May 2,1994, after the
municipal initiative had been filed. Id. The initiative sponsors argued that they should be able
to avail themselves of the law in effect at the time their initiative was filed. On appeal, this
Court disagreed. ]d.
In Owens, however, the statutory amendment had nothing at all to do with the
signature-gathering and initiative-qualifying process; rather, it had solely to do with the date
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on which the initiative would eventually be placed on the ballot. The sponsors of the St.
George initiative were not subject to two separate statutory schemes regarding the particular
requirements of gathering signatures and placing an initiative on the ballot. Under both the
pre-1994 and post-1994 statutory schemes, the mechanism for placing the initiative on the
ballot was the same; the only issue concerned when the measure would appear on the ballot.
In this case, by contrast, the 2003 amendments have everything to do with the
mechanism for gathering signatures. At the time Safe Havens filed its initiative application,
it was not necessary to gather signatures in 26 of 29 state Senate districts—under the law as
articulated after Gallivan, sponsors needed to reach a 10% threshold statewide, but did not
have to reach that threshold in a certain number of counties or Senate districts.2 In this case,
but not in Owens, the legislature changed the signature-gathering rules in mid-stream.
In other words, Owens does not concern the right to certainty regarding the process
under which the sponsor is to obtain the requisite number of verified signatures; Owens
concerns only the entitlement to an election once the process has been met. Moreover, the
policy concerns at issue here—allowing the citizens of Utah to exercise their initiative right
with some certainty that new requirements will not be imposed upon them in midstream—were not the policies implicated in Owens. Indeed, if Defendants are correct,
Owens allows the legislature to make Utahns the modern Sisyphus, forever rolling a rock up
a hill just to have it slide back down. The legislature could ensure that any given initiative
would never reach the ballot simply by changing the qualification requirements while

2

In addition, under the law in effect in March 2003, sponsors were not limited to a oneyear time window in which to collect signatures; rather, sponsors had two full election cycles
to gather and submit signatures before a re-filing became necessary.
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signatures are being gathered. Alternatively, the lieutenant governor could arbitrarily choose
which procedural mechanisms apply retroactively, and could act as a gatekeeper in situations
where the legislature does not fully articulate its intent.
In any event, Owens must be re-examined in light of this Court's ruling in Gallivan.
In Gallivan, as discussed above, this Court declared that the right of Utahns to initiate desired
legislation was a fundamental right than may not be unduly burdened. See Gallivan. 2002 UT
89,1J24, 54 P.3d 1069. Surely a scheme under which the Utah legislature would be free to
change the rules on initiative sponsors in mid-stream, during the signature gathering process,
is an undue burden on the fundamental right. In order to be able to fully exercise their
fundamental right to initiate legislation, Utahns must have certainty when beginning the
signature gathering process that the rules will not materially change during the process.3
For these reasons, Owens does not prevent this Court from determining that Safe
Havens is required to comply only with the requirements in effect on the date it filed its
initiative application, and is not required to comply with the 2003 legislative amendments.4
B.

Justiciability

Defendants maintain, and the district court agreed, that there is no justiciable
controversy regarding the Public Meetings Requirement and the Same-or-Similar Ban, because
3

Indeed, Safe Havens submits that Owens was wrongly decided, given this Court's
retroactivity jurisprudence. Initiative proponents, no less than litigants, are entitled to certainty
regarding the rules of the process, and are entitled to uhave [their] rights determined on the
basis of the law as it existed at the time of the occurrence," Okland Constr., 520 P.2d at 210,
which by rights should be the date on which the application was filed.
4

If this Court determines that the 2003 amendments are not retroactive, all but one of Safe
Havens' constitutional challenges will be mooted. The one that will remain justiciable is Safe
Havens' constitutional challenge to the Signature Removal Provisions, because the Signature
Removal Provisions stem from the old statute, and not from the 2003 amendments.
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Defendants are not applying those requirements to Safe Havens. This position is erroneous.
As an initial matter, Utah courts are not constrained by any "case or controversy"
requirement. "Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is not
constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United States Constitution
requiring 'cases' or 'controversies,' since no similar requirement exists in the Utah
Constitution." Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145,1149 (Utah 1983). Rather, justiciability issues
are governed by Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act, which "is to be liberally construed and
administered" so that litigants may be afforded "relief from uncertainty and insecurity with
respect to rights, status, and other legal relations." Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-12. This Court
"read[s] this section as allowing for a wide interpretation of what constitutes a 'justiciable
controversy.'" Salt Lake County Comm'n v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 1999 UT 73, f 12,
985 P.2d 899 (emphasis added); see Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City. 570 P.2d 119, 121
(Utah 1977) ("the court will be indulgent in entertaining actions brought to achieve [the
purposes of the Declaratory Judgment Act, especially] where there is a substantial public
interest to be served by the settlement of such an issue").
A justiciable controversy exists "if: (i) the parties are adverse; (ii) the party seeking
relief has or asserts a bona fide claim; and (iii) the issues are ripe for adjudication where it
appears 'there is an actual controversy, or that there is a substantial likelihood that one will
develop so that the adjudication will serve a useful purpose in resolving or avoiding
controversy or possible litigation.'" Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
In this case, there is no real dispute regarding the first two elements of the test—the
parties are adverse, and Safe Havens asserts a bona fide (and not a sham or manufactured)
claim against Defendants. Defendants maintain, however, that there is not a "substantial
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likelihood" that an actual controversy will develop regarding the Public Meetings Requirement
and the Same-or-Similar Requirement.
Contrary to Defendants' argument, there is at least a "substantial likelihood" that an
actual controversy will develop, and the adjudication of the claims will serve a useful purpose
in avoiding future litigation. Safe Havens is committed to the cause of placing its initiative
on the ballot. As evidenced by its several attempts, if it fails this time, it will try again. If it
tries again, it will be required to comply with the Public Meetings Requirement and the Sameor-Similar Ban. These matters will eventually be adjudicated, and it would be a poor use of
judicial and litigant resources to force these same litigants to come back later. The parties are
already here, and Safe Havens has already briefed the issues for the Court. This Court can,
and should, adjudicate all of the claims presented by Safe Havens in this matter.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CHALLENGED
PROVISIONS OF UTAH'S INITIATIVE STATUTE DO NOT VIOLATE THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION
The district court also erred by refusing to grant Safe Havens' Motion for Summary

Judgment regarding the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the Election Code.
The district court held that the three challenged provisions currently being applied to Safe
Havens (the Senate District Requirement, the One Year Requirement, and the Signature
Removal Provisions) were constitutional, and granted Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment. This ruling was error, because all five of the challenged provisions violate Article
VI, section 1, and Article I, sections 24 and 15 of the Utah Constitution.
A.

Defendants Bear the Burden of Proving That the Challenged Provisions
Are Constitutional

As an initial matter, because the interests at stake are specifically protected by the Utah
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Constitution, the presumption of validity that normally attaches to legislative acts does not
attach to the challenged provisions. In cases involving statutes which implicate specific
constitutional rights, this Court has stated that
[b]ecause the interests at stake are specifically protected by the constitution, the
presumption of validity that normally attaches to legislative action must be
reversed once it is shown that the enactment under scrutiny does, in fact,
infringe upon the interests in article I, section 11. The burden is then upon the
proponents of the legislation's validity to demonstrate that its restrictions on
those rights are carefully drawn and supported by weighty considerations.
Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572,582 n. 15 (Utah 1993) (quoting Condemarin v. University Hosp.,
775 P.2d 348, 368 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J, concurring)); see also Wood v. University of
Utah Med. Or., 2002 UT 134, ^[46, 67 P.3d 436 (a shifting majority of Justices Durham,
Russon, and Howe reaffirming the reversal of the presumption of validity in cases involving
statutes implicating specific constitutional rights); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1362
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (stating that because the challenged statute impacts a constitutional right,
"the usual presumption of validity does not control our review of the statute"). This line of
cases is not limited to the Article I, section 11 context—in Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of
Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), this Court stated that "the proponent of legislation infringing"
a fundamental right must show that the legislation is constitutional. Id. at 206.
In Gallivan, this Court declared that "[t]he reserved right and power of initiative is a
fundamental right under article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution."5 Gallivan. 2002 UT

Removal of the presumption of validity is particularly important in the initiative context.
Because the Utah Constitution makes the legislative power of the people and the legislature
coequal, any regulation of the initiative right automatically changes the balance of law-making
power between the people and their representatives. In this zero-sum scenario, it is especially
appropriate for the restriction's proponents to bear the responsibility of proving the need for
any encroachment on the people's legislative power. See Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^f59 n. 11 (the
(continued...)
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89, ^|24 (citations omitted). There can be no doubt that the statutory provisions challenged
here place restrictions upon interests "specifically protected by the constitution," and,
therefore, the usual presumption of constitutionality is reversed.

The burden falls to

Defendants to demonstrate that the challenged provisions are "carefully drawn" and
"supported by weighty considerations." Defendants cannot meet this burden.
B.

The Challenged Provisions Violate Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah
Constitution, Which Reserves to the People the Right to Initiate Legislation

The Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people and
all free governments are founded on their authority." Utah Const, art I, § 2. The people of the
State of Utah reserved and guaranteed to themselves the right to create law by initiative. See
Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^|23. In Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, the people
delegated a portion of their law-making power to the legislature, but reserved to themselves
a right to "initiate any desired legislation." In Gallivan, this Court declared that the citizens'
right to initiate legislation "is a fundamental right under article VI, section 1 of the Utah
Constitution." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ]f24 (citations omitted). This Court emphasized that
"[t]he power of the legislature and the power of the people to legislate through initiative and
referenda are coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share equal dignity." Id. at f 23.
Because the initiative right is fundamental, and coequal with the legislature's own
power to make law, the legislature "can and is required to enact legislation that implements
and enables the exercise of the people's right to initiative." Id. at ^27 (emphasis added). The

5

(...continued)
initiative process "has a different character in our constitutional system than the direct
legislative process in that the direct initiative process may be considered a constitutional check
on the representative legislature if it fails to enact widely supported legislation").
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legislature may not and must not "pass laws that unduly burden or diminish the people's right
to initiate legislation." Id. (emphasis added); accord Owens, 882 P.2d at 661 (legislature cannot pass laws that impose an "unreasonable restraint on the rights of the electorate" to legislate
through initiative). This Court has reaffirmed its duty to defend "the people's right to directly
legislate through initiative . . . against encroachment." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, at ]f27.
In GalHvan, the Court struck down the requirement that proponents gather signatures
in 20 of Utah's 29 counties equal to 10% of the persons who voted in each county in the last
gubernatorial election (the "multi-county requirement"). Id. at ^[64. The Court found, inter
alia, that the multi-county requirement imposed an impermissible burden on the initiative
right. Id. at ff49-50, 53-54, 62 ("the multi-county signature requirement unduly hinders the
ability to get initiatives on the ballot"). However, the Court also found that the multi-county
requirement was infirm because it weighted rural signatures more heavily that than urban
signatures, presenting a problem under the uniform operation of laws clause of the Utah
Constitution. Gallivant, 2002 UT 89, ^[45.
In this case, the challenged provisions do not create impermissible or suspect
classifications among Utah citizens, and therefore do not present the same uniform operation
of laws issue as the provisions challenged in Gallivan. Here, by contrast, the legislature has
enacted statutory provisions that make it much more difficult for all Utahns to place initiatives
on the ballot. The first issue for this Court is which constitutional test governs this situation.
Because this case presents the first post-Gallivan constitutional challenge brought
directly under Article VI, section 1, there is little guiding precedent regarding the appropriate
constitutional test to be applied. Safe Havens suggests two different tests, and maintains that
the challenged provisions are unconstitutional under either.
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1.

The challenged provisions are unconstitutional under an "undue
burden/enabling" test.

Safe Havens first suggests a test drawn from the language in Paragraph 28 ofGallivan,
which Safe Havens herein refers to as the "undue burden/enabling" test. The essential
question is whether the challenged restrictions comport with this Court's instruction that "the
legislature can and is required to enact legislation that implements and enables the exercise of
the people's right to initiative," and does not "unduly burden or diminish the people's right to
initiate legislation." See Gallivan. 2002 UT 89, f28. The legislation passes the test if it
facilitates and enables the initiative right, but fails the test if it imposes undue burdens on the
initiative right, or was intended simply to make the process harder for Utah citizens.6 Each of
the challenged provisions fails under this test, because each one imposes undue burdens on the
initiative right, and none enables or facilitates the right.
The Public Meetings Requirement imposes severe restrictions upon initiative-related
speech and expression in Utah. This requirement substantially and without real justification
increases the costs of qualifying an initiative for the ballot,7 making it accordingly less likely
6

The "undue burden/enabling" test suggested by Gallivan's text is akin to the "undue
burden" test applied by federal courts in the abortion context. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey. 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the right of a woman to
abort an unviable fetus cannot be unduly burdened, and that a statute imposes an undue burden
if it has "the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus." See id. (emphasis added) (as discussed by this Court in
Wood. 2002 UT 134, ^[17, 67 P.3d 436). As the following discussion demonstrates, the
challenged provisions of Utah's Election Code have the purpose and the effect of placing
substantial obstacles in the path of Utahns who seek to place an initiative before the people,
and therefore place an undue burden on the fundamental right of Utah citizens to initiate
desired legislation.
7

For example, this requirement forces sponsors to spend several weeks, at the beginning
of the initiative campaign, traveling throughout the state holding meetings, and thereby
(continued...)
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that citizens will begin the effort of attempting to qualify an initiative for the ballot.
The Senate District Requirement imposes a severe burden on the fundamental right of
Utahns to initiate legislation. As discussed more fully below, to pass a statute through the
Utah Senate, proponents need secure the votes of only 15 Senators—indeed, placing a
constitutional amendment before the electorate requires the votes of only 20 Senators.8 Yet,
to place an initiative on the ballot, sponsors must reach a 10% threshold in 26 Senate districts.
The burdens imposed by the Senate District Requirement are magnified when viewed
in conjunction with the Signature Removal Provisions, which the 2003 Legislature left
untouched from the previous statute. Those provisions allow initiative opponents unfettered
access to petition signers during the month of June (after sponsors are prohibited from
submitting additional replacement signatures), during which time signers may remove their
names from the petition. Those provisions, coupled with the Senate District Requirement,
allow initiative opponents to focus on one or two (or at most, four) Senate districts in which
sponsors have cleared the 10% hurdle by the narrowest margin. By selecting the right Senate
districts, initiative opponents can, in one month and with far fewer resources, undo all of the
sponsors' hard work and tens of thousands of signatures by persuading several hundred

7

(...continued)
substantially increasing the number of person-hours required to qualify an initiative for the
ballot. Sponsors must take time off from their jobs for these days and weeks to attend these
meetings. Sponsors must rent public meeting halls in seven cities around the state. Sponsors
must hire stenographers, videographers, or other transcription services to record and document
the meetings. Sponsors must advertise the meetings in local newspapers, but must also notify
legislators and other local elected officials individually and specifically, in a manner separate
from the notice provided to the general population.
8

In essence S.B. 28 operates as a de facto amendment of the Utah Constitution. Because
S.B. 28 makes it difficult, if not impossible, for most Utahns to exercise their law-making
power, the statute effectively edits the initiative right out of the Constitution.
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strategically-placed signers to remove their names from the petition.
The Same-or-Similar Ban imposes undue burdens on the initiative right, and amounts
to an outright ban on certain initiatives merely because identical or similar initiatives have
been suggested in the past. The Utah statute takes certain subjects, which are usually the more
hotly-debated subjects in the state, and imposes an outright ban on those subjects for two
years, cutting sponsors off before they even are able to begin speaking about the subject.9
Finally, the One-Year Requirement imposes a severe burden on initiative sponsors,
especially sponsors of all-volunteer initiative campaigns. Under the new provision, initiative
sponsors have only one year to gather the required number of signatures, and the penalty is
high if they fall short—sponsors who spend a whole year gathering signatures and come up
just short will be required to throw all of their signatures out, and start from scratch.
The restrictions imposed by the new statute are even more burdensome than the
restrictions imposed by the pre-Gallivan statutory scheme, which included the unconstitutional
multi-county requirement. R. at 475-76,490-92 (testimony of Mr. Arnold and Mr. Michael).
There can be little doubt that the challenged provisions are intended to doom, rather
than facilitate, the creation of law by initiative.10 Legislative history confirms any suspicion
9

This provision will also encourage the filing of sham initiatives, whereby initiative
opponents, in an effort to pre-empt legitimate citizen initiatives, will file initiatives on a certain
topic, make only token efforts to gather signatures, and submit those signatures. Such a
maneuver could effectively keep certain initiatives off the ballot for a two-year period.
10

In addition to placing undue burdens on initiative sponsors, the Senate District
Requirement will also place additional burdens on the county clerks and on the lieutenant
governor. Under the new scheme, the county clerks will be required to verify that each
petition signer resides in a particular Senate district. The burdens on the county clerks in the
urbanized Wasatch Front counties, where each county contains multiple Senate districts, will
be markedly increased. In addition, it may be literally impossible for the lieutenant
governor's office to come up with the magic number of required signatures in each Senate
(continued...)
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concerning the legislature's motivation for placing draconian restraints on the process. See
R. at 190,192,196,263-64 (legislative floor debates in which legislators spoke openly about
their intention to make it more difficult to place an initiative on the ballot); id. at 227-28,231 32, 235, 237, 247-48, 253, 257, 259-60 (legislative floor debates in which some legislators
warned that S.B. 28 was unduly burdening the initiative right). In light of the legislative
history and the substance of the restrictions themselves, Defendants cannot plausibly argue
that these amendments were designed to facilitate the initiative right.
The challenged provisions were designed to throw stumbling blocks in the path of
citizens who want to place issues before the voters of Utah. Under Gallivan and Article VI,
section 1 of the Utah Constitution, these restrictions cannot stand as a matter of law.
2.

The challenged provisions are unconstitutional under the
"heightened scrutiny standard" found in this Court's fundamental
rights jurisprudence.

The next alternative test suggested by Safe Havens is drawn from this Court's
jurisprudence in other "fundamental rights" cases, most notably cases arising under the
uniform operation of laws clause (Article I, section 24) and the state due process clause
(Article I, section 7). In these cases, this Court has applied heightened scrutiny to provisions
that impact "fundamental rights," upholding such provisions only if they actually and
substantially further a legitimate legislative objective and are reasonably necessary to further
that objective. The challenged provisions are unconstitutional under this test.

(...continued)
district, given the massive redistricting that has occurred since the 2000 general election. The
statute requires that the lieutenant governor provide, "to any interested person," the "total of
all votes cast in [each Utah State Senate district] for all candidates for governor." See Utah
Code Ann. § 20A-7-201(3)(b). This number may literally be un-ascertainable, imposing a
burden upon the chief election officer that is severe and undue.
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In the uniform operation of laws context, this Court has stated that legislation is
unconstitutional if it "infringes a fundamental or critical right." Peterson v. Coca-Cola USA,
2002 UT 42, |23, 48 P.3d 941 (citations omitted); accord Gallivan. 2002 UT 89, f l l ; Rvan
v. Gold Cross Services. 903 P.2d 423, 525 (Utah 1995). If the law impacts a fundamental or
critical right, the law is constitutional under the uniform operation of laws provision only if
it: "(1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative
objective, and, in fact, actually and substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3)
is reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^42. n
In the due process context, this Court applies a similar but slightly different test. This
Court has long since identified certain rights, including parental rights, as "'fundamental' for
purposes of due process," see Wells, 681 P.2d at 206, and legislation that infringes
fundamental rights is constitutional only if the proponent of that legislation can "show (1) a
compelling state interest in the result to be achieved and (2) that the means adopted are
'narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory purpose.'" Id. (citations omitted).
The right to initiate legislation is a fundamental right under the Utah Constitution. See
Gallivan. 2002 UT 89,1flj25, 27. Thus, legislative enactments that impact the right to initiate
legislation are to be considered under the heightened scrutiny standard and pass muster only
if they are reasonably necessary to further a legitimate legislative purpose. None of the
11

Safe Havens has brought a direct challenge in this case under the uniform operation of
laws clause, even though no discriminatory classification is at issue here, because much of this
Court's jurisprudence states that a uniform operations challenge may be brought when a
fundamental right is impacted. R. at 17 (complaint); R. at 76-87 (briefing on the issue below).
Safe Havens recognizes that this concept may appear in the Article I, section 24 case law
because Utah's uniform operations of law clause is commonly characterized as the Utah
analogue to the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Safe Havens further recognizes that
the fundamental rights portion of the Article I, section 24 case law might also be viewed as a
substantive due process challenge under Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.
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challenged provisions are constitutional under either test.
a.

There is no legitimate legislative purpose underlying the
challenged provisions.

Defendants bear the burden of showing that there are legitimate legislative purposes
underlying the challenged provisions.12 Defendants will be unable to meet this burden as a
matter of law because the justifications they can offer in defense of the restrictions will be
either facially pretextual or already rejected by this Court.
The Senate District Requirement and the Public Meetings Requirement. The floor
debates in the 2003 Legislature reveal that the legislature's apparent purpose in enacting the
Senate District Requirement and Public Meetings Requirement was to make Utahns living
outside the Wasatch Front gatekeepers for the initiative process.13 See R. at 234, 263
(comments of Sen. Dmitrich, Rep. Buttars, and Rep. Noel). From these comments, it is clear
that the Legislature wanted the Senate District Requirement and Public Meetings Requirement
to ensure that any issue that qualifies for the ballot has support in areas of Utah outside the
Wasatch Front. This legislative purpose is invalid for several reasons.

12

The first factor from the uniform operation of laws test—whether the restrictions are
"reasonable"—has, to Safe Havens' knowledge, never been definitively applied or explained
by this Court in the context of heightened scrutiny. The requirement appears to have been
taken from Justice Stewart's concurrence in Condemarin, where he stated that "[t]he
determination of reasonableness must take into account the extent to which the constitutional
right is . . . diminished and the extent to which the burden imposed actually furthers the
legislative goals, as well as the importance of those goals." Lee, 867 P.2d at 582 (quoting
Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 373 (Stewart, J. concurring)). To some degree, this requirement
collapses into the other two prongs of the Lee test; in fact, the Lee court did not separately
analyze the reasonableness of the challenged statute.
13

Defendants will likely argue that the Public Meetings Requirement is also justified by
the legislative purpose of promoting an informed electorate. Safe Havens agrees that this may
be a legitimate aim, but, for the reasons discussed below, the Public Meetings Requirement
actually thwarts that purpose and is therefore not reasonably necessary and is unconstitutional.
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This argument "puts the cart before the horse by giving the minority a preemptive
weapon against the perceived potential infringement of the minority's rights from the
majority's attempted resort to the initiative process." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^[61. The
Gallivan court further reasoned that putting the majority of Utahns' ability to use the initiative
process in the hands of a minority "gives the minority control of the initiative power" and
"turns our system of majority rule on its head." Id. This governmental purpose runs counter
to the premise that "majority rule is the foundation[] of both of the constitutionally mandated
mechanisms for enacting legislation." Id. at ^|60.14
Using the Senate District Requirement to avoid initiatives emanating from the Wasatch
Front is illegitimate for another reason: it erodes the people's legislative power and enhances
the legislative power the people granted to the legislature. "The power of the legislature and
the power of the people to legislate through initiative and referenda are coequal, coextensive,
and concurrent and share 'equal dignity.'" Id. at TJ23 (citations omitted). Allowing the
legislature to make it harder to pass law by initiative than it is to pass law by legislation would
permit the legislative branch to "confiscate to itself the bulk of, if not all, legislative power,"
and render "itself the only legislative game in town." Id. at ^[51.
This argument comes into clearer focus when one takes into account that to make law,
the legislature need only secure 15 votes in the Senate and 38 votes in the House. This means
that the 11 Senators representing Salt Lake County, together with any four of the ten Senators
representing Utah, Davis, and Weber Counties, could pass most legislation. Indeed, to place

14

It bears noting that, while not voiced by the legislature, this concern cuts both for and
against those living outside the Wasatch Front. With the Senate District Requirement in place,
citizens living outside the Wasatch Front cannot place initiatives on the ballot without securing
the consent of voters living in Senate Districts located in Salt Lake County.
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a constitutional amendment before the electorate, only 20 of Utah's 29 Senators (and twothirds of the members of the House) need to lend their support. This means that the 11 Salt
Lake County Senators, joined by nine of the ten Senators from Utah, Davis, and Weber
counties, could place a constitutional amendment before the electorate. Thus, it requires
broader support, measured in terms of Senate districts, for Utah citizens to place an initiative
before the electorate than it does to either (a) pass a law through the legislature or (b) place a
constitutional amendment before the electorate. The Senate District Requirement dilutes the
people's legislative power, reserved unto themselves in the Utah Constitution, to initiate
legislation. Diluting the people's legislative power is not a legitimate legislative purpose.
Indeed, this Court emphasized that "[countering the possibility of localized legislation
is not a legitimate legislative purpose" and that "[t]he legislature itself does not operate under
the requirement that legislation enacted through its processes and procedures must avoid
'localized' legislation that potentially favors one region or county of the state." Gallivan. 2002
UT 89, Tf57. Because the initiative right is "coequal" with the legislature's own power to pass
laws, creating barriers to the exercise of the initiative right that do not exist for the legislature
cannot be a legitimate legislative purpose. In short, the Public Meetings Requirement and the
Senate District Requirement do not further any legitimate legislative purpose.
The Signature Removal Provisions. Examination of the legislative debates does not
appear to yield any definitive explanation of the legislature's purposes behind its failure to
address the signature removal provisions. To be clear, Safe Havens does not challenge the
Legislature's general inclusion of a signature removal provision; indeed, this Court has long
ago stated that initiative petition signers have a "fundamental r i g h t . . . to withdraw from a
petition at any time before the petition has been acted upon." See Halgren v. Welling. 63 P.2d
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550, 557 (Utah 1936) (emphasis added).
Safe Havens does, however, challenge the timing of the current signature removal
provisions, which allow signers to remove their signatures from petitions up to July 1, when
the petitions are submitted to the lieutenant governor. The current scheme, which requires
sponsors to submit all signatures to the county clerks no later than June 1 (at which time the
signatures, including the signers' names and addresses, become public information), allows
initiative opponents at least one month of unfettered access to initiative signers,15 during which
time initiative sponsors are barred from submitting additional replacement signatures.
Because of the timing of the Signature Removal Provisions, sponsors must plan to
gather more signatures than are required by the initiative law, so that they can weather the
removal process. When coupled with the Senate District Requirement, the Signature Removal
Provisions become even more vexing because they allow opponents to target Senate districts
with the fewest signatures and pick off enough signers to "de-qualify" that district.
There does not appear to be any valid legislative purpose behind the timing of the
Signature Removal Provisions. It would seem to be just as effective, and completely in line
with Halgren, to institute a scheme in which signers could remove their names until the
petitions begin to be "acted upon" by the county clerks. Safe Havens can only assume that this
framework is designed to tilt the playing field in favor of initiative opponents and to make it
harder to qualify initiatives for the ballot. The Gallivan Court made clear that this is not a
legitimate legislative purpose. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^J51 (the "purpose of ensuring that 'init-

15

Enactment of the new One-Year Requirement means that opponents will, in many cases,
have much longer than one month to conduct precision removal campaigns. Sponsors will be
compelled by the One-Year Requirement to submit signatures well in advance of June 1,
giving opponents potentially several months to contact petition signers.
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iatives are not so easy to get on the ballot"' "clearly is not a legitimate legislative purpose").
The Same-or'-Similar Ban. The Legislature's purpose in enacting the Same-or-Similar
Ban was set forth by the bill's sponsor, Sen. Hickman, who bluntly stated as follows:
The reason for that was because we, on occasion, have had petitions and initiatives developed on a local level and fluoridation is a classic example of that,
where it just keeps coming back and coming back and coming back. So, we
thought that from the—until there was a change in state policy or attitude by the
voters that a four-year period of time was reasonable. The Attorney General has
asked us to maybe shorten that, and so we have reduced it to a two-year period.
R. at 223 (emphasis added). Thus, the Legislature's purpose in enacting the two-year ban was
to prevent certain initiatives from "coming back and coming back and coming back."
As a practical matter, the initiatives that are continually filed and circulated, year in and
year out, are often the ones devoted to issues around which the most robust public debate
swirls—term limits, fluoridation, guns in schools, radioactive waste, etc. It hardly needs to
be argued that the Legislature's stated purpose—a blatant attempt to impose an outright ban
on certain initiatives, which are often the most hotly-debated ones—is not legitimate.
The One-Year Requirement. Examination of the legislative history does not yield any
information regarding the legislature's purpose in repealing the provision that, formerly, had
allowed sponsors two election cycles to qualify their initiative for the ballot, and shortening
the signature collection period to one year. In any event, Defendants will be hard pressed to
articulate any legitimate legislative purpose supporting the amendments.
Safe Havens has taxed its creative powers to divine what justifications Defendants
could propose to justify these restrictions.16 The State's inability to justify these new burdens
16

It is worthy of note that, before the district court, Defendants did not even attempt to
justify any of the challenged provisions (other than the Senate District Requirement) as
furthering any legitimate governmental objective. Specifically, no argument was even
(continued...)
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will lead inexorably to the conclusion that the legislature put these hurdles in the law solely
to make it more difficult to qualify initiatives for the ballot. The Gallivan court has already
opined that the legislature has no legitimate interest in making it harder to place initiatives on
the ballot. Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, ^[51 (the "purpose of ensuring that 'initiatives are not so
easy to get on the ballot'" "clearly is not a legitimate legislative purpose").
Simply stated, with the possible exception of the purpose of promoting an informed
electorate, the challenged provisions are not justified by legitimate governmental interests.
b.

Even if legitimate governmental interests existed, the challenged
provisions do not actually and substantially further those
interests.

To pass muster under heightened scrutiny, it is not enough that Defendants articulate
a legitimate legislative interest. Defendants must also demonstrate that the legislation "has
more than a speculative tendency to further the legislative objective, and, in fact, actually and
substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose." Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, TJ42.
As noted above, Safe Havens sincerely doubts that Defendants can advance any
legitimate goal for any of the challenged provisions. For this reason, they cannot meet their
burden of showing that those provisions actually and substantially further any legitimate
legislative end. Even assuming, arguendo, that promoting statewide geographic support for
initiatives, or promoting a better-informed electorate, were legitimate legislative purposes for
some of the restrictions, the amendments do not actually further those legislative ends.
The Asserted Purpose of Achieving Statewide Support: The Gallivan Court examined
this proposition at length with respect to the multi-county requirement (and, as noted above,

16

(...continued)
mounted that the Public Meetings Requirement, the Signature Removal Provisions, the OneYear Requirement, or the Same-or-Similar Ban furthered any legitimate governmental aim.
6(H739v2

-34-

stated emphatically that countering localized legislation was not a legitimate governmental
purpose, Gallivan, 2002 UT 89, at 1J57). Because the logic Gallivan employed applies with
equal force in this context, it bears quoting the entire analysis:
In addition, the multi-county signature requirement does not actually and
substantially further the legislative purpose of ensuring statewide support, that
is, broadly distributed geographic support, or of promoting initiatives regarding
issues of statewide interest. The multi-county signature requirement has the
opposite effect. By giving an effective veto to the rural minority over the urban
majority, initiatives that enjoy statewide support from the majority of the
population and therefore focus on issues of at least numerical statewide concern
are prevented from qualifying for the ballot. In this respect, the multi-county
signature requirement thwarts the placement on the ballot of widely supported
initiatives. Effectively, only initiatives of rural concern and with rural support
get placed on the ballot, thus defeating the use of the initiative process and
purpose of statewide support. Therefore, the multi-county signature
requirement with regard to this purpose does not pass the Lee test because it
does not actually and substantially further the stated legislative purpose of
ensuring statewide support.
Gallivan. 2002 UT 89, f 50. Stated differently, the Gallivan court concluded that the multicounty requirement did not actually and substantially ensure statewide support for initiatives
because it had the effect of keeping issues off the ballot that were of a concern to a numerical
majority of Utahns statewide. That rationale applies here as well. The Senate District
Requirement ensures that an initiative cannot be placed on the ballot unless it appeals to a
number of voters outside the Wasatch Front. This means that only those issues that are of
concern to those who live outside the Wasatch Front can be placed on the ballot. This
decreases the number of issues that can qualify. For this reason, even assuming, arguendo,
that mustering statewide support were a legitimate governmental purpose, the Senate District
Requirement does not substantially further that aim.
The Asserted Purpose of Achieving a Well-informed Electorate: Defendants may argue
that the Public Meetings Requirement (and perhaps the Senate District Requirement as well)
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substantially furthers the goal of promoting a well-informed electorate. This Court has
rejected this justification. In Gallivan, this Court opined that the circulation of petitions only
informs a small number of voters, and that "in reality, it is after the initiative is placed on the
ballot and the campaigns for and against the initiative are underway that the electorate
becomes informed." GalHvan, 2002 UT 89, ^62. This Court further found that a geographic
requirement is irrelevant to this process "because the electorate becomes informed" once the
election commences "whether [or not] the proponents of an initiative circulated the initial
petition in and garnered signatures from" the required counties. Id. at ^[63.
An examination of newspaper articles on initiatives that qualify for the ballot bears out
the Gallivan Court's reasoning. Before an initiative qualifies for the ballot (that is, during the
signature-collecting phase), public debate on the proposed initiative is minimal. However,
once an initiative actually qualifies for the ballot, public debate on the issues surrounding the
proposed initiative increases dramatically.

In 2002, newspaper articles regarding the

Radioactive Waste Restrictions Act increased approximately two-fold after the measure
qualified for the ballot. See R. at 281 -94. The RWRA may have been an anomaly, however,
because of a great deal of pre-qualifying publicity regarding the initiative process itself. In
2000, the increase in public debate regarding the "English as the Official Language" initiative
subsequent to qualifying for the ballot is even more striking, with public debate appearing to
increase by a factor of approximately ten. Id. atfflf5-6. Public debate, and with it awareness
of facts regarding the issues surrounding the initiative, increases greatly after the measure
qualifies for the ballot. If the objective is truly to have a better-informed electorate, the best
way to further this objective is to allow more initiatives to qualify for the ballot, not fewer.
Simply stated, none of the proffered justifications, even if legitimate, are actually and
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substantially furthered by the challenged restrictions.
c.

The challenged provisions are not reasonably necessary to
further a legitimate goal

Finally, the challenged restrictions are not "reasonably necessary to further a legitimate
goal," Lee, 867 P.2d at 583, and are not "narrowly tailored to achieve the basic statutory
purpose," Wells, 681 P.2d at 206. This is so for two reasons. First, as discussed above, there
are no legitimate legislative goals underlying the restrictions. Second, even if there were, the
restrictions are not reasonably necessary to promote those goals, because there are other lessrestrictive methods that the legislature could employ to achieve these ends.
The legislative history makes it difficult for Defendants to credibly claim that these
restrictions were carefully drawn. Time and again during the debates on the amendment,
legislators expressed concerns that the restrictions were too burdensome. See R. at 227-28,
231-32, 235, 237, 247-48, 253, 257, 259-60. Time and again the Legislature as a whole
ignored these concerns, rejected amendments designed to address these stated concerns, and
kept the broad restrictions in place. See R. at 190, 192, 196, 263-64.
Thus, Defendants cannot meet their burden on any of the prongs of the heightened
scrutiny test, and therefore the challenged provisions are unconstitutional under that test. No
matter which test this Court ultimately selects, the challenged provisions must be struck down
and excised from the statute books.
C.

The Challenged Provisions Violate Article I, Section 15 of the Utah
Constitution

The challenged provisions also violate Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution,
which guarantees that "[n]o law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech
or of the press." There is very little published case law interpreting this section, leading this
603739v2

-37-

Court to conclude that the free speech provision "has never been authoritatively interpreted."
KUTV, Inc. v. Conder, 668 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1983). Moreover, there is very little history
to help mold a proper standard to adjudicate state free speech claims. Id. (stating that "[t]he
history of Article I, Section 15 of the Utah Constitution is sparse"). The most substantive
guidance from this Court is that the Utah Constitution should afford broader rights than the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Provo City Corp. v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456
n.2 (Utah 1989).17 In light of the lack of precedent, Safe Havens suggests that this Court apply
the same heightened scrutiny framework established in this Court's uniform operation of laws
jurisprudence to free speech challenges under the Utah Constitution.
1.

The challenged provisions fail under heightened scrutiny and are
therefore unconstitutional.

As described at length above, when fundamental rights are at issue, heightened scrutiny
is appropriate. Because freedom of speech is unquestionably a fundamental right.,18 under the
existing uniform operations test the heightened scrutiny analysis would apply automatically
to any section 15 challenge. See supra part II.B.3. Applying the heightened scrutiny test to
an Article I, section 15 challenge, this Court would first question whether the restrictions on
speech are justified because they actually and substantially further a valid legislative purpose.

17

As discussed below, the new initiative restrictions do violate the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, because they impose severe restrictions on core political speech. See infra.
Part III. If the restrictions fail under the U.S. Constitution, they must necessarily fail under
Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution.
18

See Utah Const., art. I, § 1 (stating that "[a]ll men have the inherent and inalienable right
. . . to communicate freely their thoughts and expressions"); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 558
(Utah 1988) (stating that "[fjreedom of speech is not only the hallmark of free people, but is,
indeed, an essential attribute to the sovereignty of citizenship"); Meyer v. Grant 486 U.S. 414,
420 (1988) (freedom of speech is uamong the fundamental personal rights and liberties which
are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State").
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Lee, 867 P.2d at 583. As discussed above, the initiative restrictions will not clear this hurdle.
This Court would next examine whether the requirements are reasonably necessary to
further a legitimate legislative purpose. Id. The answer, for the reasons outlined above, is a
resounding "No." Accordingly, if this Court decides to apply the fundamental rights analysis
to challenges under Article I, section 15, the new restrictions will fail.
2.

The challenged provisions fail under the federal free speech test, and
are therefore unconstitutional.

If this Court chooses not to apply the fundamental rights/heightened scrutiny
framework to Safe Havens' Article I, section 15 challenge, this Court should perhaps apply
the federal test, articulated in more detail below. For the reasons stated below, the challenged
provisions do not pass muster under the federal test.
For all of these reasons, the challenged portions of Utah's initiative statute are
unconstitutional under Article I, section 15 of the Utah Constitution.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CHALLENGED
PROVISIONS OF UTAH'S INITIATIVE STATUTE DO NOT VIOLATE THE
U.S. CONSTITUTION
In addition to violating the Utah Constitution, the challenged provisions also violate

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, because they burden core
political speech and impose severe restrictions upon rights of free speech and political
expression.19

19

The U.S. Constitution applies to this situation, notwithstanding the fact that the U.S.
Constitution does not require states to institute any initiative process. A state may choose not
to provide its citizens with the right to initiate legislation; the U.S. Supreme Court has made
clear, however, that if a state chooses to provide its citizens with an initiative process, that
state must do so in a manner consistent with the U.S. Constitution. See Meyer v. Grant. 486
U.S. 414, 420, 424-25 (1988): see also Bradv v. Ohman, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 16206, *7
(10th Cir. Jul. 15, 1998) (R. at 295).
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A.

The Challenged Provisions Must Be Subjected to Strict Scrutiny

In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that
[a] court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the
character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against
"the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those
interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiffs rights."
Burdick v. Takushl 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citations omitted). Under this standard, the
rigor of the reviewing court's inquiry into a state election law "depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights." Id. When
voters' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights "are subjected to 'severe' restrictions" by a
challenged election law, the law is subject to strict scrutiny—"the regulation must be
'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance.'" Id. (citations
omitted). However, when a state election law imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions" upon First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, then "'the state's important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions." Id. (citations omitted).
Although the "severe restriction" standard set forth in Burdick appears, by its terms,
to apply to a challenge to any state election law, the U.S. Supreme Court has not applied the
Burdick framework to challenges to all state election laws. In cases subsequent to Burdick.
the Supreme Court has instituted another level of inquiry—before applying the
Burdick framework, it first looks to see whether the challenged state law impacts "core
political speech," rather than commercial speech or the mere "mechanics of the electoral
process." See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182,186
(1999) (applying strict scrutiny, without resort to Burdick, because the challenged law
impacted "core political speech"); id. at 207-08 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that "[w]hen
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a state's election law directly regulates core political speech, we have always subjected the
challenged restriction to strict scrutiny," but stating that if the law merely regulates "the
mechanics of the electoral process," the Burdick framework should be applied); Mclntyre v.
Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (stating that "[w]hen a law burdens core
political speech, we apply 'exacting scrutiny'"). If the law burdens core political speech, strict
scrutiny is applied, without resort to Burdick.
In this case, the challenged provisions of Utah's initiative statute must be subject to
strict scrutiny under either analysis. As discussed below, they impact "core political speech,"
and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny under Buckley, and they impose "severe
restrictions" on free speech rights, and are therefore subject to strict scrutiny under Burdick.
1.

The challenged provisions burden "core political speech."

Utah's initiative statute must be subjected to strict scrutiny because it impacts "core
political speech." In Meyer v. Grant. 486 U.S. 414 (1988), certain citizens challenged a
provision of Colorado's initiative statute that made it a crime to pay signature gatherers. The
Court first needed to decide which level of scrutiny to apply to the Colorado provision. In
reaching its determination, the Court emphasized that "the circulation of a petition involves
the type of interactive communication concerning political change that is appropriately
characterized as 'core political speech.'" Meyer. 486 U.S. at 421-22 (citations omitted). The
Court further noted that the provision criminalizing the payment of signature gatherers
restricts political expression in two ways: First it limits the number of voices
who will convey appellees' message and the hours they can speak, and,
therefore, limits the size of the audience they can reach. Second, it makes it less
likely that appellees will garner the number of signatures necessary to place the
matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of
statewide discussion.
Id. at 422-23. The Court proceeded to apply "exacting scrutiny" to the provision, noting in
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the process that "the burden that Colorado must overcome to justify" its criminalization of the
payment of signature gatherers "is well-nigh insurmountable." Id. at 420, 425.
Similarly, in Buckley, the Court again strictly scrutinized certain provisions of
Colorado's initiative statute. This time, citizens were challenging Colorado's requirements
that signature gatherers be registered to vote in Colorado and wear an identification badge
bearing their name; and that initiative sponsors report the names and addresses of all paid
signature gatherers and the amount paid to each signature gatherer. The majority of the Court,
without even citing to Burdick or using the Burdick analysis, proceeded to apply a form of
strict scrutiny because the Colorado initiative statute impacted "core political speech," an area
where First Amendment protection is "at its zenith." Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186, 192 & n.12.
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment, noted that "[w]hen a state's election law directly
regulates core political speech, we have always subjected the challenged restriction to strict
scrutiny," but stating that if the law merely regulates "the mechanics of the electoral process,"
the Burdick framework should be applied. Id. at 207-08. Ultimately, the Court applied a form
of strict scrutiny to Colorado's initiative law, because it burdened core political speech.
Like the Colorado initiative restrictions at issue in Meyer and Buckley, the restrictions
imposed by Utah's initiative statute also burden core political speech and must therefore be
subjected to strict scrutiny. As noted above, Safe Havens challenges, under the Utah
Constitution, five different restrictions placed on the initiative right by Utah's new statute: (1)
the Senate District Requirement; (2) the Signature Removal Provisions; (3) the Public
Meetings Requirement; (4) the Same-or-Similar Ban; and (5) the One-Year Requirement. Safe
Havens also brings a federal constitutional challenge to the first four (but not the fifth) of these
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provisions.20 These four provisions, both individually and collectively, burden the circulation
of initiative petitions, an activity which has been held to be "core political speech." See
Meyer, 486 U.S. at 421-22, and the individual burdens imposed upon core political speech by
each of the challenged provisions of the Utah initiative statute are greater than the burdens
imposed by the Colorado regulations struck down in Meyer and Buckley.
The Same-or-Similar Ban. The Same-or-Similar Ban severely restricts initiative-related
speech and expression. This provision takes certain subjects, typically among the more hotlydebated subjects in the state, and imposes a flat ban on those subjects for two years, cutting
sponsors off before they even are able to begin speaking. It is difficult to imagine a more
severe restriction on speech, one that is compounded by its content-based nature.
In addition, the ban could amount to more than a two-year ban, if initiative opponents
take advantage of this provision by filing sham initiatives, expending only token effort to
gather a few signatures, designed to keep similar initiatives off of the ballot in future elections.
The ban directly impacts the free speech rights of initiative sponsors, and clearly makes it less
likely that sponsors will qualify an initiative for the ballot. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423.
The Public Meetings Requirement. The Public Meetings Requirement imposes severe
restrictions upon initiative-related speech and expression in Utah. As detailed at length above,
this requirement substantially increases the costs of qualifying an initiative for the ballot. The
increased costs will undoubtedly cause persons to abandon plans to bring initiatives which will
20

Safe Havens does not bring a federal challenge to the One-Year Requirement. The
Tenth Circuit has previously upheld a six-month time limit. See American Const. Law
Foundation v.Meyer, 120F.3d 1092,1098-99 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding a six-month signature
gathering time limit constitutionally permissible). The ACLF case was taken to the U.S.
Supreme Court, where it was re-captioned Buckley v. ACLF, but the Tenth Circuit's decision
to uphold the signature-gathering time limit was not directly at issue in Buckley. Safe Havens
has therefore opted to challenge this provision only under the Utah Constitution.
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chill the quantum of speech on core political issues. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423.
The Senate District Requirement. The Senate District Requirement imposes a severe
burden on the core political speech and expression associated with the rights of Utahns to
initiate legislation. As discussed above, to pass a statute through the Utah Senate, proponents
need secure the votes of only 15 Senators—indeed, placing a constitutional amendment before
the electorate requires the votes of only 20 Senators. Yet, to place an initiative before the
electorate, sponsors must reach a 10% threshold in 26 Senate districts.
This requirement clearly burdens speech, not only because it requires sponsors to speak
in areas of the state where they may not otherwise have chosen to speak, but also because it
"makes it less likely that [sponsors] will gamer the number of signatures necessary to place
the matter on the ballot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of statewide
discussion." Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423. Indeed, as discussed above, initiatives only become the
focus of true statewide discussion after they qualify for the ballot, not before. Gallivan, 2002
UT 89, TJ63; R. at 281-94. Requiring initiative proponents to meet standards higher than those
required of proponents of constitutional amendments is clearly a severe restriction, and one
that chills speech by deterring Utah citizens from attempting to initiate legislation. R. at 121.
The Signature Removal Provisions. The burdens imposed by the Senate District
Requirement are magnified when that requirement is viewed in conjunction with the Signature
Removal Provisions. As discussed above, those provisions (along with the Senate District
Requirement) allow initiative opponents to focus on one or two (or at most, four) Senate
districts, and, by persuading several hundred strategically-placed signers to remove their
names from the petition, initiative opponents can, in one month and with far fewer resources,
undo all of the sponsors' hard work and tens of thousands of signatures. In effect, the
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legislature has created a one-month period in which initiative opponents are allowed unfettered
free speech, but in which initiative sponsors' free speech is restricted. These provisions also
make it less likely that an initiative will qualify for the ballot, and thus severely restrict
initiative-related speech and expression in Utah. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423.
Each of these provisions imposes severe restrictions upon Utahns' initiative-related
speech and expression. However, collectively, these provisions impose an incredible burden
on the initiative process, and have the effect of discouraging all but the most well-heeled
interest groups from mounting an initiative campaign.

In short, because Utah's new

restrictions directly burden core political speech, they must be subjected to strict scrutiny.
2.

The challenged provisions impose "severe restrictions" on Utahns'
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Moreover, even if the Burdick framework were to apply here, strict scrutiny would still
be the result. As Justice Thomas noted, "restrictions on core political speech [] plainly impose
a 'severe burden.'" See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 208. This fact alone, as discussed above,
compels strict scrutiny. Moreover, the burdens imposed by Utah's new initiative statute are
incredibly severe, a fact made plain by comparison to the relatively benign provisions of the
Colorado initiative statute struck down in Buckley.
In that case, the restrictions which the U.S. Supreme Court held burdened "core
political speech" were restrictions requiring signature gatherers (a) to be registered to vote in
Colorado, (b) to wear name badges, and (c) to report their income from signature gathering.
These restrictions, while certainly annoying, did not impose a burden of the same magnitude
as that imposed by the Utah restrictions. The Colorado restrictions directly at issue in Buckley
contained no outright ban on certain initiatives, and did not concern the actual requirements
for qualifying an initiative for the ballot. The Colorado restrictions imposed only an indirect
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burden, as opposed to a direct burden, on initiative sponsors' ability to qualify an initiative for
the ballot. Still, the Court intimated that the Colorado regulations imposed a "severe" burden
on speech. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192 & n.12; id. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Thus, even under a Burdick-style analysis, Utah's initiative statute must be subjected
to strict scrutiny. Accordingly, whether or not the Burdick framework is applied, this Court
must apply strict scrutiny to the challenged provisions of Utah's initiative statute.
B.

The Challenged Provisions Cannot Pass Muster Under Strict Scrutiny

To pass muster under strict constitutional scrutiny, the challenged statutory provision
must be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 192
& n.12; id. at 207 (Thomas, J., concurring); Burdick. 504 U.S. at 434.
As discussed above, supra Part II.B, the challenged provisions do not serve any state
interest that rises to the level of "compelling." And, even assuming such an interest existed,
the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve those interests, because there are other, less
burdensome ways to further the asserted interests of the legislature.
IV.

SEVERABILITY—THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE ARE
SEVERABLE FROM THE REMAINDER
Because portions of Utah's initiative statute are unconstitutional and must be struck

down, the final question surrounds severability, and whether the offending portions of the
statute are severable from the remainder. For the reasons set forth below, the offending
portions of the statute are in fact severable from the remainder, because an operable statute
remains in place under which initiatives may be qualified for the ballot.
A.

General Severability Principles—The Presumption of Severability

Any analysis of the severability question must begin with the "general rule" that
"' statutes, where possible, are to be construed so as to sustain their constitutionality.
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Accordingly, if a portion of the statute might be saved by severing the part that is
unconstitutional, such should be done.'" See State v. Lopes. 1999 UT 24, ^[18,980 P.2d 191
(citations omitted). Thus, there is a presumption that the unconstitutional portion of the statute
can be severed without affecting the remainder.
This presumption can, of course, be overcome with a showing that the legislature
intended that the unconstitutional portion of the statute not be severable from the remainder.
See, e.g.. Stewart v. Utah Public Serv. Comm,n. 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994) (stating that
severability "is primarily a matter of legislative intent"). In some cases (like this one), the
legislature places a severability provision into the statute, explicitly setting forth its intent
regarding severability. If such a provision exists, then legislative intent is plain. More often,
however, the legislature does not expressly set forth its intent regarding the severability of
statutory provisions. In such cases, courts must "turn to the statute itself, and examine the
remaining constitutional portion of the statute in relation to the stricken portion. If the
remainder of the statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the
statute will be allowed to stand." Lopes. 1999 UT 24, f 19, 980 P.2d 191.
B.

Legislative Intent

The Utah legislature included in S.B. 28 a severability provision, but one which is
extremely narrow. That provision reads in its entirety as follows:
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(1)

Except as provided in subsection (2), it is the intent of the Legislature
that if any provision of this act, or the application of any provision of
this act to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of
this act shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

(2)

It is the intent of the Legislature that:
(a)
Subsection 20 A-7-201 (1 )(a)(ii) [requiring sponsors of an
initiative to be submitted to the Legislature, rather than to
the people, to reach a 5% threshold in 26 of 29 Utah
"47-

(b)

Senate districts] is not severable from Subsection 20A-7201(l)(a)(i) [the general statewide 5% threshold]; and
Subsection 20 A-7-201 (2)(a)(ii) [requiring sponsors of an
initiative to be submitted to the people to reach a 10%
threshold in 26 of 29 Utah Senate districts] is not
severable from Subsection 20A-7-201 (2)(a)(i) [the general
statewide 10% threshold].

See R. at 220. Thus, it is clear, from Subsection (1), that the legislature intended that (a) the
Public Meetings Requirement, (b) the Signature Removal Provisions, (c) the Same-or-Similar
Ban, and (d) the One-Year Requirement all be severable from the remainder of the statute.
Regarding the Senate District Requirement, however, the legislature is of a different
(and very specific) mind, as set forth in Subsection (2). It has stated that the Senate District
Requirement is not severable from the general statewide 10% threshold, meaning that if the
Senate District Requirement is struck down, the general 10% statewide threshold falls as well.
However, the severability provision is extremely narrow, and specifically does not state that,
if the Senate District Requirement falls, the entire statute must also fall. The Senate District
Requirement is specifically not severable only from the general 10% threshold.
C.

The Result of the Severability Provision

The result of the very specific and narrow severability provision is that, if all five of the
provisions which Safe Havens challenges are struck down, the following statutory scheme will
be in place: sponsors may qualify an initiative for the ballot without obtaining any signatures
and without holding any public meetings. Sponsors will be required only to submit an
application to the lieutenant governor, who will review the application for constitutionality and
absurdity (but will not be able to reject applications based on the same-or-similar requirement)
and approve or reject it. Because no signature requirement exists, but the rest of the statute
is expressly intact under the legislature's severability provision, the county clerks must still
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check each signature for accuracy and pass them along to the lieutenant governor, who then
must mark "sufficient" all initiative packets, no matter how many signatures the sponsors have
gathered. While this result may seem strange, it is in fact compelled by the plain language of
the legislature's own severability provision.
This statutory scheme, while certainly different from past initiative statutes, is certainly
"operable" and certainly furthers the purpose of facilitating the right of Utah citizens to initiate
legislation. See Lopes. 1999 UT 24,^19,980 P.2d 191 (stating that "[i]fthe remainder of the
statute is operable and still furthers the intended legislative purpose, the statute will be allowed
to stand"). Thus, if this Court agrees with Safe Havens that the challenged portions of the
statute are unconstitutional, then Safe Havens is entitled to a declaration that it will be able to
qualify its initiative for the ballot without complying with a specific signature requirement.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is Safe Havens (and not Defendants) who are entitled
to summary judgment. This Court should declare that either (a) the new provisions of S.B. 28
do not apply to Safe Havens, or (b) the challenged provisions are unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Order and Judgment of the district court should be reversed, and this case
should be remanded to the district court with instructions to grant Safe Havens' Motion for
Summary Judgment.
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ISSUES SUBMITTED TO THE VOTERS

20A-7-201

20A-7-103. Constitutional amendments and other questions — Procedures for submission to popular
vote.
(1) The procedures contained in this section govern when:
(a) the Legislature submits a proposed constitutional amendment or
other question to the voters; and
(b) an act of the Legislature is referred to the voters by referendum
petition.
(2) In addition to the publication in the voter information pamphlet required by Section 20A-7-702, the lieutenant governor shall, not more t h a n 60
days or less than ten days before the regular general election, publish the full
text of the amendment, question, or statute in at least one newspaper in every
county of the state where a newspaper is published.
(3) The legislative general counsel shall:
(a) entitle each proposed constitutional amendment "Constitutional
Amendment Number
" and give it a number;
(b) entitle each proposed question "State Proposition Number
"
and give it a number;
(c) entitle each state referendum t h a t has qualified for the ballot
"Citizen's State Referendum Number
" and give it a number;
(d) draft and designate a ballot title t h a t summarizes the subject
m a t t e r of the amendment or question; and
(e) deliver them to the lieutenant governor.
(4) The lieutenant governor shall certify the number and ballot title of each
amendment or question to the county clerk of each county no later t h a n the
second Friday after the primary election.
(5) The county clerk of each county shall:
(a) ensure t h a t both the number and title of the amendment, question,
or referendum is printed on the sample ballots and official ballots; and
(b) publish them as provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-103, e n a c t e d by L.
1995, ch. 340, $ 20; 2001, ch. 57, § 4; 2002,
c h . 127, § 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted Subsections (3)(a), (3)(b), and (3)(c) for former Subsection (3)(a) which read "designate the
amendment or question by number and order of

presentation on the ballot" and changed the
subsection designations
The 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002,
m Subsection (2) added the phrase at the beginning ending with "Section 20A-7-702" and
substituted "not more than 60 days or less than
ten days" for "not later t h a n 60 days "

PART 2
STATEWIDE INITIATIVES
20A-7-201. Statewide initiatives — Signature requirements — Submission to the Legislature or to a
vote of the people.
(1) (a) A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to the Legislature
for approval or rejection shall obtain:
(i) legal signatures equal to 5% of the cumulative total of all votes
cast for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election
at which a governor was elected; and
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(n) from each of at least 26 Utah State Senate districts, legal
signatures equal to 5'# of the total of all votes cast in t h a t district for
all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at
which a governor was elected
Ob) If, at any time not less t h a n ten days before the beginning of an
annual general session of the Legislature, the lieutenant governor declares sufficient any initiative petition t h a t is signed by enough voters to
meet the requirements of this Subsection (1), the lieutenant governor shall
deliver a copy of the petition and the cover sheet required by Subsection
(l)(c) to the president of the Senate, the speaker of the House, and the
director of the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
(c) In delivering a copy of the petition, the lieutenant governor shall
include a cover sheet t h a t contains
d) the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for
governor at the last regular general election at which a governor was
elected,
(n) the total of all votes cast in each Utah State Senate district for
all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at
which a governor was elected,
(m) the total number of certified signatures received for the submitted initiative, and
(IV) the total number of certified signatures received from each
U t a h State Senate district for the submitted initiative
(2) (a) A person seeking to have an initiative submitted to a vote of the
people for approval or rejection shall obtain
d) legal signatures equal to 10% of the cumulative total of all votes
cast for all candidates for governor at the last regular general election
at which a governor was elected, and
(n) from each of at least 26 U t a h State Senate districts, legal
signatures equal to 10% of the total of all votes cast in t h a t district for
all candidates for governor at the last regular general election at
which a governor was elected
(b) If, at any time not less t h a n four months before any regular general
election, the lieutenant governor declares sufficient any initiative petition
t h a t is signed by enough legal voters to meet the requirements of this
subsection, the lieutenant governor shall submit the proposed law to a
vote of the people at the next regular general election
(3) The lieutenant governor shall provide the following information from the
official canvass of the last regular general election at which a governor was
elected to any interested person
(a) the cumulative total of all votes cast for all candidates for governor,
and
(b) for each U t a h State Senate district, the total of all votes cast in t h a t
district for all candidates for governor
History: C. 1953,20A-7-201, e n a c t e d by L.
1994, ch. 1, * 11; 1995, ch. 152, § 8; 1998, ch.
1 3 M 1; 1999, ch. 115, § 1; 2003, ch. 304, * 1.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 1999 amend
ment, effective May 3 1999, rewrote Subsec
tion (l)(b) and added Subsection (l)(c)
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003,
substituted "26 Utah State Senate districts" for
"20 counties" in Subsections (D(aXn) and
(2)(a)(n), substituted "Utah State Senate dis

tnct" for 'county" in Subsections (l)(c)(n),
(lXc)dv), and (3)(b), and substituted "district"
for "count>" in Subsections (l)(a)(n), (2)(a)(n),
and (3 Kb)
S e v e r a b i l i t y Clauses. — Laws 2003 ch
304 § 9 provides that Subsection (l)(a)(u) is not
severable from Subsection (l)(a)(i) and Subsection (2)(a)(n) is not severable from Subsection
(2)(a)(i)
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20A-7-202

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality
Severability
Constitutionality.
The multi county signature requirement of
Subsection (2)(a)(n) (before the 2003 amendment substituted Senate districts for counties)
violated the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution, Art I § 24, and
the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amend-

ment to the U S Constitution Gallivan v
Walker, 2002 UT 89, 54 P 3 d 1069
Severability.
Unconstitutional multi-county signature requirement of Subsection (2)(a)(n) (before the
2003 amendment substituted Senate districts
for counties and added a nonseverability provi
sion) was severable from the rest of the mitiative enabling statute Gallivan v Walker, 2002
UT 89, 54 P 3d 1069

20A-7-202. Statewide initiative process — Application
procedures — Time to gather signatures —
Grounds for rejection.
(1) Persons wishing to circulate an initiative petition shall file an application with the lieutenant governor
(2) The application shall contain
(a) the name and residence address of at least five sponsors of the
initiative petition,
(b) a statement indicating t h a t each of the sponsors
(I) is a resident of Utah, and
(n) has voted in a regular general election in U t a h within the last
three years,
(c) the signature of each of the sponsors, attested to by a notary public,
(d) a copy of the proposed law, and
(e) a statement indicating whether or not persons gathering signatures
for the petition may be paid for doing so
(3) The application and its contents are public when filed with the lieutenant governor
(4) (a) The sponsors shall qualify the petition for the regular general
election ballot no later t h a n one year after the application is filed
(b) If the sponsors fail to qualify the petition for that ballot, the
sponsors m u s t
d) submit a new application,
(n) obtain new signature sheets, and
(in) collect signatures again
(5) The lieutenant governor shall reject the application and not issue
circulation sheets if
(a) the law proposed by the initiative is patently unconstitutional,
(b) the law proposed by the initiative is nonsensical,
(c) the proposed law could not become law if passed, or
(d) the law proposed by the initiative is identical or substantially
similar to a law proposed by an initiative t h a t was submitted to the county
clerks and lieutenant governor for certification and evaluation within two
years preceding the date on which the application for this initiative was
filed.
History: C. 1953, 20A-7-202, e n a c t e d by L.
1994, ch. 1, ^ 12; 1995, ch. 153, ^ 1; 1999, ch.
45, * 9; 2003, ch. 304, ^ 2.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s — I he 1999 amend
ment effective March 15 1999 substituted

"resident of Utah for 'registered voter ' in Sub
section (2)(b)(i)
The 200 3 amendment effective May 5 2003
added Subsection (2)(e) substituted 'one year '
for 'the second regular general election' in
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Subsection (4)(a), added Subsection (5)(d), and
made related changes
Severability Clauses. — Laws 2003, ch
304, ^ 9 makes the amendments to this section,
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if held imalid, severable from the remainder of
the act, which also amended H 20A-7-201,
20A-7-203, 20A-7-207, 20A-7-213, 20A-11-702,
and 20A-11-802 and enacted ^ 20A-7-204 1

20A-7-203. F o r m of initiative petition and
sheets.

signature

(1) (a) Each proposed initiative petition shall be printed in substantially
the following form:
"INITIATIVE PETITION To the Honorable
, Lieutenant Governor:
We, the undersigned citizens of Utah, respectfully demand that the
following proposed law be submitted to the legal voters/Legislature of
Utah for their/its approval or rejection at the regular general election/session to be held/beginning on
(month/day/year);
Each signer says:
I have personally signed this petition;
I am registered to vote in U t a h or intend to become registered to vote in
U t a h before the certification of the petition names by the county clerk; and
My residence and post office address are written correctly after my
name.
NOTICE TO SIGNERS:
Public hearings to discuss this petition were held at: (list dates and
locations of public hearings.)"
(b) The sponsors of an initiative shall attach a copy of the proposed law
to each initiative petition.
(2) Each signature sheet shall:
(a) be printed on sheets of paper 8-V2 inches long and 11 inches wide;
(b) be ruled with a horizontal line 3A inch from the top, with the space
above that line blank for the purpose of binding;
(c) contain the title of the initiative printed below the horizontal line;
(d) contain the word "Warning" printed or typed at the top of each
signature sheet under the title of the initiative;
(e) contain, to the right of the word "Warning," the following statement
printed or typed in not less t h a n eight-point, single leaded type:
"It is a class A misdemeanor for anyone to sign any initiative petition
with any other name t h a n his own, or knowingly to sign his name more
t h a n once for the same measure, or to sign an initiative petition when he
knows he is not a registered voter and knows t h a t he does not intend to
become registered to vote before the certification of the petition names by
the county clerk."; and
(f) be vertically divided into columns as follows:
(i) the first column shall appear at the extreme left of the sheet, be
% inch wide, be headed with "For Office Use Only," and be subdivided
with a light vertical line down the middle with the left subdivision
entitled "Registered" and the right subdivision left untitled;
(ii) the next column shall be three inches wide, headed "Registered
Voter's Printed Name (must be legible to be counted)";
(iii) the next column shall be three inches wide, headed "Signature
of Registered Voter"; and
(iv) the final column shall be 4-% inches wide, headed "Street
Address, City, Zip Code".
(3) The final page of each initiative packet shall contain the following
printed or typed statement:
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"Verification
State of Utah, County of.
I,
, of
., hereby state that:
I am a resident of U t a h and am at least 18 years old;
All the names t h a t appear in this packet were signed by persons who
professed to be the persons whose names appear in it, and each of them signed
his name on it in my presence;
I believe t h a t each h a s printed and signed his name and written his post
office address and residence correctly, and t h a t each signer is registered to vote
in U t a h or intends to become registered to vote before the certification of the
petition names by the county clerk.
I have not paid or given anything of value to any person who signed this
petition to encourage them to sign it.
(Name)
(Residence Address)
(Date)"
(4) The forms prescribed in this section are not mandatory, and, if substantially followed, the initiative petitions are sufficient, notwithstanding clerical
and merely technical errors.
History: C. 1953,20A-7-203, e n a c t e d by L.
1994, ch. 1, * 13; 1995, ch. 153, $ 2; 1999, c h .
45, § 10; 2000, ch. 3, § 5; 2000, c h . 75, § 11;
2003, ch. 304, § 3.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1999 amendment, effective March 15, 1999, substituted "a
resident of Utah" for "registered to vote in
Utah" m the fourth line of the form in Subsection (3)
The 2000 amendment by ch 3, effective May
1, 2000, updated the date line in Subsection
(l)(a) and added the age requirement "at least
18 years old" to Subsection (3)
The 2000 amendment by ch 75, effective May

1, 2000, updated the date line in Subsection
(l)(a)
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003,
added the requirement to list public hearings m
Subsection (l)(a), deleted former Subsection
(2)(f) concerning ruled lines under the Warning
statement, added the last sentence in Subsection (3), and made related changes
S e v e r a b i l i t y C l a u s e s . — Laws 2003, ch
304, § 9 makes the amendments to this section,
if held invalid, severable from the remainder of
the act, which also amended §§ 20A-7-201,
20A-7-202, 20A-7-207, 20A-7-213, 20A-11-702,
and 20A-11-802 and enacted § 20A-7-204 1

20A-7-204.1. Public hearings to be held before initiative
petitions are circulated.
(1) (a) Before circulating initiative petitions for signature statewide, sponsors of the initiative petition shall hold at least seven public hearings
throughout Utah as follows:
(i) one in the Bear River region — Box Elder, Cache, or Rich
County;
(ii) one in the Southwest region — Beaver, Garfield, Iron, Kane, or
Washington County;
(iii) one in the Mountain region — Summit, Utah, or Wasatch
County;
(iv) one in the Central region — J u a b , Millard, Piute, Sanpete,
Sevier, or Wayne County,
(v) one in the Southeast region — Carbon, Emery, Grand, or San
J u a n County;
(vi) one in the Uintah Basin region — Daggett, Duchesne, or
Uintah County; and
(vii) one in the Wasatch Front region — Davis, Morgan, Salt Lake,
Tooele, or Weber County
(b) Of the seven meetings, at least two of the meetings must be held in
a first or second class county, but not in the same county
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(2) At least three calendai days before the date of the public hearing, the
sponsors shall
(a) provide written notice of the public hearing to
(1) the lieutenant governor for posting on the state's website, and
(n) each state senator, state representative, and county commission
or county council member who is elected in whole or in part from the
region where the public hearing will be held, and
(b) publish written notice of the public hearing detailing its time, date,
and location in at least one newspaper of general circulation in each
county in the region where the public hearing will be held
(3) (a) During the public hearing, the sponsors shall either
d) video tape or audio tape the public hearing and, when the
hearing is complete, deposit the complete audio or video tape of the
meeting with the lieutenant governor, or
(n) take comprehensive minutes of the public hearing, detailing the
names and titles of each speaker and summarizing each speaker's
comments
(b) The lieutenant governor shall make copies of the tapes or minutes
available to the public
History C 1953, 20A-7-204 1, e n a c t e d b y
L 2003, ch 304, ** 4.
Severability C l a u s e s — Laws 2003 ch
304 § 9 makes this section if held invalid
severable fi om the remainder of the act which

also amended ^ 20A 7 201 to 20A 7 203 20A
7 207 20A 7 213 20A 11 702 and 20A 11 802
Effective D a t e s — Laws 2003 ch 304
became effective on May 5 2003, pursuant to
U t a h Const Art VI Sec 25

20A-7-205. Obtaining s i g n a t u r e s — Verification — Removal of s i g n a t u r e .
(1) Any U t a h voter may sign an initiative petition if the voter is a legal
voter
(2) The sponsors shall ensure t h a t the person in whose presence each
signature sheet was signed
(a) is at least 18 years old and meets the residency requirements of
Section 20A-2-105, and
Ob) verifies each signature sheet by completing the verification printed
on the last page of each initiative packet
(3) (a) d) Any voter who has signed an initiative petition may have his
signature removed from the petition by submitting a notarized
statement to t h a t effect to the county clerk
(n) In order for the signature to be removed, the statement m u s t be
received by the county clerk before he delivers the petition to the
lieutenant governor
(b) Upon receipt of the statement, the county clerk shall remove the
signature of the person submitting the statement from the initiative
petition
(c) No one may remove signatures from an initiative petition after the
petition is submitted to the lieutenant governor
History C 1953, 20A-7 205, e n a c t e d by L.
1994, ch. 1, <* 15; 1995, c h 153, t> 4,1995,'ch.
165, 6 1, 1999, ch. 45, <* 11, 2000, ch. 3, * 6.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1999 amend
ment effective March 15 1999 deleted former
Subsection (2)(a) which read is registered to

vote in Utah redesignating existing Subsec
tions (2Kb) and (2)(c) as (2)(a) and (2Kb)
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1 2000,
at least 18 yeais
a d d e d the age lequirement
to Subsection (2)(a)
0\d

Art V, $ 1
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ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Applicability
d i m e s and criminal procedure
— Parole
Judicial infringement
Legislative infringement
Applicability.
This section does not limit the authonty of
the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT), as an administrative body, to make
lules because, although administrative bodies
are nominally designated a part of the execu
tive branch, they do not fall within the constitutional definition of the Executive Department, therefore, the prohibition of Art V, Sec I
does not apply Robinson \ State, 2001 UT 21,
20 P 3d 396
Crimes and criminal p r o c e d u r e .
—Parole.
The Board of Pardons' exercise of its parole
power in setting determinate paiole dates does
not violate the separation of powers doctrine
Padilla v Utah Bd of Pardons & Parole, 947
P 2 d 664 (Utah 1997)

J u d i c i a l infringement.
Allowing a court to select a paiticulai piose
cutor to appear and prosecute a cuminal case
appears to be an impeimissible mfi mgement
upon the executive branch's duty and right to
direct the prosecution Salt Lake City v
Dorman-Ligh, 912 P2d 452 (Utah Ct App
1996)
Section 59-1-601, which purports to giant the
district court jurisdiction to review by t u a l de
novo final decisions of the state tax commission
resulting from formal hearings, is unconstitutional under Utah Const, Art XIII, Sec 11 and
this section Evans & Sutherland Computer
Corp v Utah State Tax Comm'n, 953 P2d 435
(Utah 1997)
L e g i s l a t i v e infringement.
Section 78 51-25, prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law, did not encroach on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
regulate the practice of law as granted by U t a h
C o n s t , Art VIII, § 4 Board of Comm'rs of State
Bar v Petersen, 937 P2d 1263 (Utah 1997)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
U t a h Law Review. — Case Law Development Constitutional Law — Code Provisions
Providing for Legislative Appointments to Judicial Conduct Commission Held Constitu-

tional, 1998 Utah L Rev 596
Recent Developments in Utah Law —Administrative Law, 2001 Utah L Rev 1019

ARTICLE VI
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section
1 [Power vested in Senate, House and People 1
2 [Time of general sessions ]
3 [Election of House members — Terms 1
4 [Election of Senators — Terms 1

Section
5 [Who is eligible as a legislator J
29 [Lending public credit forbidden — Exception 1
32 [Appointment of additional employees —
Legal counsel 1

Section 1. [Power vested in Senate, House and People.]
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated
the Legislature of the State of Utah, and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Art. VI, § 1

(2) (a) (i) The legal voters of the State of Utah in the numbers, under the
conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute,
may:
(A) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted
to the people for adoption upon a majority vote of those voting on
the legislation, as provided by statute; or
(B) require any law passed by the Legislature, except those
laws passed by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each
house of the Legislature, to be submitted to the voters of the
State, as provided by statute, before the law may take effect
(ii) Nothwithstanding Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A), legislation initiated
to allow, limit, or prohibit the taking of wildlife or the season for or
method of taking wildlife shall be adopted upon approval of two-thirds
of those voting.
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under
the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute,
may:
(i) initiate any desired legislation and cause it to be submitted to
the people of the county, city, or town for adoption upon a majority vote
of those voting on the legislation, as provided by statute; or
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of
the county, city, or town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as
provided by statute, before the law or ordinance may take effect.
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 6, 1900; 1998,
S.J.R. 10, ^ 1; 1999, S.J.R. 5, *> 3.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — Laws 1998, S J R
10, § 1 proposed amending this section to add
the second sentence of the second paragraph in
Subsection 2 The proposed amendment was
approved by the voters of the state at the 1998
general election and took effect on J a n u a r y 1,
1999
Laws 1999, S J R 5, § 3 proposed amending
this section The amendment subdivided the
section, added "Notwithstanding Subsection

(2)(a)(i)(A)" in Subsection (2)(a)(n), in Subsection (2) substituted "adoption upon a majority
vote" for "a vote of the people for approval or
rejection" twice, "statute" for "law" twice, "in
the numbers" for "such fractional part thereof"
twice, and "county, city, or town" for "legal
subdivision" or "legal subdivision of the State"
m three places, and made numerous stylistic
changes throughout the section The amendment was approved by the electors of the state
and took effect on J a n u a r y 1, 2001

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANAI YSIS

Administrative bodies
Initiative and referendum
Cited
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies.
Although Utah Const , Art VI, Sec 1 does
restrict the ability of the legislature to delegate
legislative functions to administrative agencies, the legislature specifically granted the
Utah Department of Tiansportation the power
to enact administrative tules in the language of
§ 72 1-201 Robinson v State, 2001 UT 21, 20
P 3d 396

Initiative and r e f e r e n d u m .
The provision of ^ 20A-7-501 for submission
of an initiative to voters of a city at the next
municipal general election is not an unreasonable restraint on the rights of the electorate by
the legislature in limiting the opportunity for
city-wide initiatives to two-year intervals
Owens v Hunt, 882 P2d 660 (Utah 1994)
Cited in Biglei v Vemon, 858 P2d 1391
(Utah 1993), A B v State, 936 P2d 1091 (Utah
Ct App 1997), cert granted, 945 P2d 1118
(Utah 1997), Galiivan v Walker, 2002 UT 89, 54
P 3 d 1069, Low v City of MonticeUo, 2002 UT
90 54 P3d 1153

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals, any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-

Art. I, § 24

mmation of urban blight Tribe v Salt Lake
City Corp , 540 P 2d 499 (Utah 1975)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am J u r 2d Franchises
§§ 9 to 23

C. J . S . — 37 C J S Franchises $ 26
Key Numbers. — Franchises <s=> 11

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws,]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

vate or special laws, Utah C o n s t , Art VI, Sec
26

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general
Age of majority
Agent for service of process
Automobile license law
Construction with Art VI, § 26
Contract carrier permit
Cosmetologists' license law
Criminal actions
—In vesti gations
—Prosecution
—Sentence
Criminal sentence
Disparate tax assessments
Excess revenue refunds
Guest statutes
Inheritance Tax Law
Insurance premium tax exemption
Intoxicating liquor
Licenses
Massage parlor ordinance
Municipal employment prerequisites
Notice requirements
Property
—Responsibility for water service
Public employees' retirement system
Public officers' bonds
Public officers' salaries
Road poll tax
School activities
Search warrants
Sunday closing laws
Tax sales
Unfair Practices Act
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted State v
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P 894, 26 A L R
696 (1921)
Objects and purposes of law present touchstone for determining proper and improper

classifications State v Mason, 94 U t a h 501, 78
P 2d 920,117 A L R 330 (1938), State v J B &
R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766
(1941)
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such
State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah
523, 116 P 2 d 766 (1941)
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for differentiation
between classes or subject matters included, as
compared to those excluded, provided differentiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of
act State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100 Utah
523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941)
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched State v J B & R E Walker,
I n c , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941)
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional State v J B & R E Walker,
I n c , 100 Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941)
Inability of legislature to make perfect clas
sification does not render statute unconstitu
tional State v J B & R E Walker, Inc , 100
Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941)
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional discrimination is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreasonable distinctions Gronlund v Salt Lake City,
113 Utah 284 194 P 2d 464 (1948)
An act is never unconstitutional because of
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

P.2d 1302 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894,
104 S. Ct. 241, 78 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1983).

Cited in State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1301
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitutional Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 82.
Note, State v. Nielsen: Immaterial False
Statements in Search Warrant Affidavits, 1987
Utah L. Rev. 753.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — Labor Law, 1988 Utah L.
Rev. 284.
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Procedure, 1989
Utah L. Rev. 223.
Brigham Young Law Review. — An Analytical Model to Assure Consideration of Parental and Familial Interests When Defining
the Constitutional Rights of Minors — An Examination of In re Scott K , 1980 B.Y.U. L.
Rev. 598.
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note
discussing "open fields" doctrine, 11 J.
Contemp. L. 531 (1985).
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. J u r . 2d Searches
and Seizures § 6 et seq.
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures
§ 3 et seq.
A.L.R. — Admissibility, in civil case, of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure,
5 A.L.R.3d 670.
Lawfulness of seizure of property used in violation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action
or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473.
Validity of consent to search given one in
custody of officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858.
Traffic violation: lawfulness of search of motor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation,
10 A.L.R.3d 314.
Propriety of considering hearsay or other incompetent evidence in establishing probable
cause for issuance of search warrant, 10
A.L.R.3d 359.
Criminal liability for obstructing process as
affected by invalidity or irregularity of the process, 10 A.L.R.3d 1146.
Sufficiency of description, in search warrant,

of apartment or room to be searched in multipie-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330.
Modern status of rule as to validity of
nonconsentual search and seizure made without warrant after lawful arrest as affected by
lapse of time between, or difference in places
of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727.
Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful
search and seizure, 20 A.L.R.Sd 724.
Propriety of execution of search warrant at
nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951.
Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on
communications between accused and his attorney, 44 A.L.R.4th 841.
Validity of arrest made in reliance upon uncorrected or outdated warrant list or similar
police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550.
Officer's ruse to gain entry as affecting admissibility of plain-view evidence—modern
cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425.
Search and seizure: necessity that police obtain warrant before taking possession of, examining, or testing evidence discovered in
search by private person, 47 A.L.R.4th 501.
Eavesdropping on extension telephone as invasion of privacy, 49 A.L.R.4th 430.
Propriety of state or local government health
officer's warrantless search — post-Camara
cases, 53 A.L.R.4th 1168.
Seizure of books, documents, or other papers
under search w a r r a n t not describing such
items, 54 A.LR.4th 391.
Search and seizure of telephone company
records pertaining to subscriber as violation of
subscriber's constitutional rights. 76 A.L.R.4th
536.
Necessity t h a t Miranda warnings include express reference to right to have attorney
present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R. Fed.
123.
Fourth Amendment as prohibiting strip
searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees, 78
A.L.R. Fed. 201.
Key Numbers. — Searches and Seizures «=»
2, 7(1).

Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the t r u t h may be given in evidence
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury t h a t the matter charged as
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends,
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the
law and the fact.
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AMENDMENT I—FREEDOM OF RELIGION, SPEECH AND
PRESS; PEACEFUL ASSEMBLAGE; PETITION
OF GRIEVANCES
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
HISTORICAL NOTES
Proposal and Ratification of Amendments 1 to 10
The first ten amendments to the Constitution of the United States, which
comprise the Bill of Rights, set out in 1
Stat. 97, were proposed to the Legislatures of the several States by the First
Congress, on September 25, 1789. They
were ratified by the following States,
and the notifications of ratification by
the governors or secretaries of state
thereof were communicated successively
by the President to Congress: New Jersey, November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January
25, 1790; Delaware, January 28, 1790;
Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; New
York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island,
June 15, 1790; Vermont, November 3,
1791, and Virginia, December 15, 1791.
The Legislatures of Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts ratified them on
April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939, and
March 2, 1939, respectively.

Twelve articles were proposed on September 25, 1789. The first two, which
failed of adoption, read as follows:
"Art. I. After the first enumeration
required by the first article of the Constitution, there shall be one representation
for every thirty thousand, until the number shall amount to one hundred, after
which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall be not
less than one hundred representatives,
nor less than one representative for every forty thousand persons, until the
number of representatives shall amount
to two hundred; after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress,
that there shall not be less than two
hundred representatives, nor more than
one representative for every fifty thousand persons.
"Art. II. No law varying the compensation for the services of the senators
and representatives shall take effect, until an election of representatives shall
have intervened."

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
WESTLAW supplements U.S.C.A. electronically and is useful for additional
research. Enter a citation in INSTA-CITE for display of parallel citations
and case history. Enter a constitution, statute or rule citation in a case law
database for cases of interest.
Example query for INSTA-CITE: 790 F.2d 978
Example query for United States Constitution: (first +6 amendment) +s
religion
Example query for statute: "42 U.S.C.*" +4 1983
Also, see the WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this
volume.

AMENDMENT XIV—CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION
OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT
Materials for the Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of Section 1 are set out in this volume. See the
following three volumes for materials pertaining to the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of that section and
Sections 2 to 5.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3- No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort
to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel537
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lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
HISTORICAL NOTES
Proposal and Ratification
This amendment was proposed to the
legislatures of the several States by the
Thirty-ninth Congress, on June 13, 1866.
On July 21, 1868, Congress adopted and
transmitted to the Department of State a
concurrent resolution, declaring that
"the legislatures of the States of Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon,
Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West
Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa,
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana,
being three-fourths and more of the several States of the Union, have ratified
the fourteenth article of amendment to
the Constitution of the United States,
duly proposed by two-thirds of each
House of the Thirty-ninth Congress:
Therefore, Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby declared to be a
part of the Constitution of the United
States, and it shall be duly promulgated
as such by the Secretary of State/' The
Secretary of State accordingly issued a
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, declaring that the proposed fourteenth
amendment had been ratified by the legislatures of thirty of the thirty-six States.
The amendment was ratified by the State
Legislatures on the following dates:
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19,
1866; New Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon, Sept. 19, 1866; Vermont, Oct. 30,
1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; New York,
Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 1867;
Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia,

Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867;
Minnesota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan.
19, 1867; Nevada, Jan. 22, 1867;
Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; Missouri, Jan.
25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7, 1867;
Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania,
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20,
1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa,
Mar. 16, 1868; Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868;
Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina,
July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868;
South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama,
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868.
Subsequent to the proclamation the following States ratified this amendment:
Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; Mississippi, Jan.
17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870; Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 4,
1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976.
The Fourteenth Amendment originally
was rejected by Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas and Virginia. However, the State
Legislatures of the aforesaid States subsequently ratified the amendment on the
dates set forth in the preceding paragraph. Kentucky and Maryland rejected
this amendment on Jan. 10, 1867 and
Mar. 23, 1867, respectively.
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and
Oregon "withdrew" their consent to the
ratification of this amendment on Mar.
24, 1868, Jan. 15, 1868, and Oct. 15,
1868, respectively.
The State of New Jersey expressed
support for this amendment on Nov. 12,
1980.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS

78-33-1

CHAPTER 33
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
Section
78-33-1.
78-33-2.

78-33-3.
78-33-4.
78-33-5.

Jurisdiction of district courts —
Form - Effect.
Rights, status, legal relations under instruments or statutes
may be determined.
Contracts.
Suit by fiduciary or representative.
Court's general powers.

Section
78-33-6.
78-33-7.
78-33-8.
78-33-9.
78-33-10.
78-33-11.
78-33-12.
78-33-13.

Discretion to denv declaratory relief.
Appeals and reviews.
Supplemental relief.
Trial of issues of fact.
Costs.
Parties.
Chapter to be liberally construed.
"Person" defined.

78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect.
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to
declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is
or could be claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the
ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and such declaration
shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.
History: L. 1951, c h . 58, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-33-1.
Cross-References. — Jurisdiction of district court, § 78-3-4.

Submitting controversy without action, { 7811-11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

County, 13 Utah 2d 412, 375 P 2 d 756 (1962).

Construction and application.
Court's lack of jurisdiction.
— Procedure.
Dismissal
— Effect
— Pending criminal action involving identical
questions.
Exclusiveness of remedy
Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
— Legal question
Extent of relief granted
Joinder of actions
Quieting title
Subjects for relief
— Constitutionality of ordinance
— Taxation
Exemption.
Right to tax
— Water rights.
Cited

Court's lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n .
There was no case or controversy ripe for
adjudication in an attorney's suit against the
Utah State Bar where the Utah State Bar had
barely begun a preliminary investigation into
an allegation of unauthorized practice of law,
and, as a result, no accrued set of facts existed
to support attorney's claim, and the attorney
had merely received two letters of inquiry from
the bar Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d
917 (Utah 1993).

Construction a n d a p p l i c a t i o n .
The Declaratory Judgments Act ( ^ 78-33-1
to 78-33-13) is not designed tor giving advisory
opinions in a nonadversary action, or to insure
against feared risk. Backman v Salt Lake

— Procedure.
Proper procedure with respect to defendant's
claim t h a t justice of the peace court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction was a petition for an
extraordinary writ, and not a declaratory judgment action McRae & DeLand v. Feltch, 669
P2d 404 (Utah 1983).
Dismissal.

- Effect.
Dismissal of teacher's suit tor declaratory
judgment determining status under Teachers
Retirement Act for lack of jurisdiction was not
res judicata barring subsequent mandamus
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICI^ DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATEtfR^UTAHTIW^>- ,
UTAH SAFE TO LEARN-SAFE TO
WORSHIP COALITION, INC., d/b/a
SAFE HAVENS FOR LEARNING, a
Utah non-profit corporation,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 030909591
vs,
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK
THE STATE OF UTAH, a
governmental entity; OLENE
WALKER, in her official
capacity as Lieutenant Governor
of the State of Utah; and MARK
SHURTLEFF, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of
the State of Utah,

Court Clerk: Cindy Beverly
June 19, 2003

Defendants.

The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff's Motion and Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary
Judgment as well as Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(Justiciability).

The Court heard oral argument with respect to

the motions on June 16, 2003.

Following the hearing, the matters

were taken under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
Safe Havens is an organization which is attempting to pass a

SAFE HAVENS v. STATE OF UTAH Page 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

law banning concealed weapons in Utah schools.

After filing its

application to circulate a petition to have the matter voted on
by ballot initiative (with the Lieutenant Governor in March
2003), the Elections Office informed Safe Havens that it will
have to comply with certain of the requirements in the Utah
Election Code (which took effect May 5, 2003).

With this

Complaint, Safe Havens contends retroactive application of the
law is improper and, consequently, Safe Havens seeks a
declaratory judgment that it need not comply with the new rules.
To the extent this Court finds that the statutory amendments can
be applied retroactively, Safe Havens seeks a judgment that many
of the recent changes to the Election Code are unconstitutional
and asks this Court to clarify what Safe Havens must do to
qualify for the 2004 general election.
Turning first to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
(Justiciability), the record in this matter makes clear two of
the provisions of SB 28 are not being enforced against plaintiff.
Specifically, the public hearing requirement and the provision
disallowing the Lieutenant Governor from being able to approve
for circulation an initiative if a similar one had been submitted
within the previous two years, are not being applied against the
plaintiff.

This having been said, even liberally construing the

Declaratory Judgment Act, as urged by plaintiffs, the Court is
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not persuaded a justiciable controversy exists between the
parties concerning those sections.

Indeed, without a threat of

enforcement of such claims against the plaintiff, the Court would
merely be rendering an improper advisory opinion.

Accordingly,

defendants' motion is granted.
With respect to plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
after reviewing the relevant law, the Court finds defendants are
not applying the Code provisions retroactively, but rather, if
and when plaintiff submits the signature sheets to the county
clerks, they will apply the law in effect at that time to
determine if there are sufficient signatures.

In addition, when

the signatures are submitted, the clerks will apply the current
law to determine if the signatures have been submitted within a
timely fashion (within one year of the effective date of the
Act.)

This is not a retroactive application of law, but rather,

the application of law in effect at the time the governmental
decision is made.

Moreover, in Owens v. Hunt, 882 P.2d 660, 661

(Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that the
initiative process can change during the pendency of an
initiative.

Xd. at 661. As to the case of Gallivan v. Walker, 54

P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002), although the Court did reference concerns
with the "undue burdening" of fundamental rights, that case
clearly concerns itself with the uniform operation of laws clause
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of the Utah Constitution and was based upon the determination by
the court that the multi-county signature requirement

(requiring

signatures equal to 10 percent of the number of voters for
governor in the last election in each of 20 of 29 counties) was a
discriminatory classification which impermissibly discriminated
between urban and rural voters and counties.

In this case,

in

response to Gallivan, there is no similar discriminatory
classification as SB 28 requires the signatures be gathered in
each of 26 of 29 senate districts, which are population-based and
evenly divided.

Further, the other challenged provision,

requiring initiatives to qualify within one year, creates no
discriminatory classification, nor is it a burden on qualifying
an initiative to be on the ballot.
With respect to plaintiff's arguments surrounding free
speech, such are not implicated by any of these initiative
provisions.

Free speech and the right to vote are not concerned,

necessarily, in initiative procedures, but only if the State
attempts to regulate speech associated with the initiative
process.

Palisade Fruitlands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204 (10th cir.

2002) .
Based upon the forgoing, the Court does not reach the
arguments regarding severability.

Defendants' Cross Motion for

Summary Judgment is granted and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
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Judgment is, respectfully, denied.1
DATED this

x

ll^ay

of June, 2003,

The Court notes that in light of the ruling with respect to
justiciability, this may not be the best case for challenging the
constitutionality of the new Election Code requirements.
Specifically, although the burdens remaining to be addressed at
this juncture do not in and of themselves create an undue burden,
if at some later date, all five requirements were to be
considered by the Court, the outcome may not be the same.
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